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Abstract:  The use of performance-based, or incentive based, compensation plans is ubiquitous 
in the private sector.  Private business operates under the belief that the use of incentives leads to 
increased performance from employees and higher profits for the companies.  This study is 
centered on the function of those performance-based pay plans within the government.  Its 
purpose is to determine if the use of such pay plans is effective, both for the efficiency of 
government organizations and the motivation of employees.  Through the analysis of 
government documents and organizational plans, and interviews of human resource managers 
and employees, this study analyzes performance-based pay and its effectiveness in the public 
sector. 
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Introduction       
 
Performance-based pay has been utilized in the private sector for many years.  The pay 
scheme is based on an employee’s performance, measured by some predetermined means, which 
then leads to compensation based on that measure.  These schemes incorporate a determination 
of productivity that is communicated to the employee at the onset of each measurement period, 
yearly, quarterly, or monthly.  Once the performance threshold is established, the employee is 
monitored, continuously or at certain preset intervals, and feedback is given on their progress. 
Employees who perform above the threshold level are awarded for their performance by 
incentive pay through either permanent salary increases or one time awards.  In the event the 
employee is failing to perform at the threshold level, management works with the employee to 
understand the reasons for the shortcomings and ways to correct them. If the employee does not, 
or cannot, correct their deficiencies, they may be terminated, or in some instances re-assigned.        
Performance-based pay is very functional within private industry where the measure of 
performance is usually based on the company’s profitability, or the employee’s ability and 
performance in making the company profitable.  Pay systems that incorporate straight 
commissions on sales, profit sharing, and performance bonuses are all examples of private 
industry’s belief that employees are motivated by incentives, and that given the proper 
incentives, including attainable goals, employees will perform better.   
With the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the federal government began 
to study the subject of performance-based pay and was given the authority to utilize more 
modern ways to both classify the duties, and measure the performance, of government 
employees. As a result, the Office of Personnel Management, in conjunction with the General 
Accounting Office engaged in a number of experiments to measure the effectiveness of merit 
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based pay systems within the public sector. Currently, there are government organizations that 
utilize performance-based pay, and the movement to integrate performance-based pay within the 
entire public sector continues to gain acceptance and advocacy, as seen through its continuous 
implementation in that sector.   
 The concept that employees will perform to a higher level and work harder for incentives 
is intuitive, but employees within the public arena perceive incentives differently and have 
different motivations than those in the private sector.  Public workers recognize that their jobs 
are tied to the advancement of the public good, and with that, many look for intrinsic motivation, 
or that feeling of accomplishment, in addition to monetary rewards.  
 In addition to differences in motivation, the problem of implementing a functional 
evaluation process, one that uses private sector measures to evaluate public sector outcomes, can 
present, in some instances, an overwhelming obstacle.  The public sector operates in an 
environment that recognizes a diverse number of performance measures, which are arrived at, for 
the most part, subjectively.  The problem is that while private sector measures are easily 
quantitative, based on, as stated earlier, profitability or categories that lead to profitability, the 
public sector encompasses many different responsibilities, which require performance measures 
that are complex and thus difficult to determine.  This diversity is a challenge for performance 
based pay schemes that rely on objective determinants of performance.  That is, the objective 
measures used in performance based pay schemes in the private sector are difficult to incorporate 
into the public sector at the operational level. By operational level, I refer to the point where the 
employee’s performance is measured and that performance measurement is then converted to 
rewards.   
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 While the movement to performance-based pay systems continues to gain momentum, 
and with a cursory understanding of the inherent problems in utilizing such systems, it is 
important to understand the operation of the current federal pay system and how it relates to the 
changes advocated by performance-based pay proponents.  The federal government currently 
utilizes the General Schedule.  This pay system is based on 15 advancing levels of compensation 
from GS1, low entry level, through GS15, upper management.   
 Employees enter government service in one of these levels based on the designation of 
their specific job title and their level of experience.  The levels are referred to as GS levels, and 
although they begin at GS1, many jobs, at entry level, are classified as higher. For instance, 
many clerical positions enter at the GS2 level and progress through GS8.  Within the General 
Schedule, employee advancement through these levels is based on the position’s GS level range, 
and on yearly evaluations based on the employee’s ability to acquire new skills and perform 
more intricate duties.  Additionally, the General Schedule contains provisions that recognize 
outstanding performance, and has highly structured employee discipline procedures, including an 
employee grievance process in the event of an adverse employment action.  Although the 
General Schedule contains some of the same concepts of performance-based pay such as 
increases based on performance and performance bonuses, it is postulated by merit pay 
advocates that performance-based pay schemes more specifically tie an employee’s performance 
to compensation increases and rewards, unlike the General Schedule which allows for more 
ambiguity in what constitutes proper performance, and provides even more latitude to 
management on what basis bonuses may be awarded. 
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Problem Statement  
 The Department of Homeland Security was formed in response to the September 11th 
attacks and includes 22 agencies representing a workforce of approximately 170,000 employees 
The Department is currently implementing a new human resource system, designated Max HR.  
The system is built within the construct of pay banding and performance based incentive pay, 
and is currently beginning to supplant the Department’s General Schedule System.  While the 
Department’s reasons for the change to a performance based pay system, such as improved 
employee efficiency and a more effective organization seem compelling, there are inherent 
problems with Max HR.  It is my contention that the full implementation of the pay system, as it 
is currently conceived, may result in a dysfunctional system that will be detrimental to the 
organization and the employees.  This assessment is not without historical foundation, for in 
many experiments involving merit pay schemes, involving the public and private sectors, the 
concept of performance-based pay has not proven to be as sound in operation as in theory.   
 The information presented in the review of the literature will give insights into the 
functionality of performance-based pay systems.  That information will be used to determine if 
performance-based pay, as utilized in the private sector, is a functional alternative to the current 
grade/step system now utilized in the federal government.  This determination of functionality 
will be based on concepts of system equity, ability to fairly evaluate employee performance, 
system viability, ability to remain financially solvent, the management function of the systems, 
and the ability of management to effectively administer the system.  These questions will be 
addressed within the context of performance-based pay in general, with specific focus on the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Max HR to determine its ultimate success upon full 
implementation. 
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Literature Review 
 In examining the research concerning performance based pay, information from a diverse 
array of sources was used.  Academic studies, governmental studies, governmental advisory 
papers, and operational plans provided by governmental agencies that currently utilize 
performance based pay schemes were all examined to compile a comprehensive representation of 
the current issues involved in the performance based pay discussion. This review is divided into 
seven general concepts. The concepts cover the main ideas that influence performance-based pay 
systems, and are further broken down into subcategories that represent the important issues 
presented throughout the literature.   
 The use of performance-based pay is espoused to increase organizational effectiveness by 
offering incentives to employees.  The reasoning being that as employees work to earn the 
incentives, they will be more productive, and in turn that will benefit the organization.  In 
considering the need for transition to a performance-based pay system, it is important to 
understand the reasons for the proposed change, and what the organization expects to gain.  The 
literature views those reasons from four different perspectives.   
The Theoretical Perspective    
 The theoretical perspective proposes that the need for performance-based pay is 
precipitated by the change in government function.  That is, that society is constantly evolving, 
and government must make changes to adjust to that change. 
 The theoretical perspective is furthered by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler in their book 
Reinventing Government, How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector, in 
which they propose that the huge government of the past, containing highly structured and 
complex bureaucracies, which was needed during the Great Depression and both world wars, has 
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outlasted its usefulness (Pg 13).  Instead, the authors postulate that a new government, focused 
on flexibility and imagination, is needed to address society’s current issues (Pg 14-16).   
 The authors also espouse the idea that the new government needs to be led by incentives 
and possess the ability to use persuasion and a feeling of personal ownership to complete its 
mission (Pg 31).  Out of these concepts, came the introduction of merit-based compensation 
within the government, and with it, the effect of a dramatic change in the way that government 
operates.  The concepts espoused by the authors are important in that they illustrate a historical 
evolution of theoretical approaches to government and the idea that change is needed to address 
the new government culture.  These ideas are profound in they present a radical departure from 
the current approach to government operation.  While the ideas do hint of the ubiquitous 
“government should be run like a business”, even more, they clarify the need for change to 
address change, and not a movement to a pure business model.  
The Competitive Perspective 
 The competitive perspective encompasses the idea that the need for change is based on 
the need of business to stay competitive in the market place.  The drive to stay competitive leads 
to the need for incentives to increase production. 
 In their study “Promise and Peril in Implementing Pay for Performance: A Report on 
Thirteen Natural Experiments,” Michael Beer and Mark Cannon introduce the competitive 
perspective.  The authors state that the driving force behind the advent of performance incentives 
is the fact that companies are continually searching for ways to enhance their competitiveness in 
a given market (Pg 3).  In fact, the authors point to studies that show a majority of private 
companies have implemented some type of performance-based compensation philosophy in 
order to enhance the productivity of their employees (Pg 4).  Beer and Cannon further support 
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the intuitive belief that employees will work harder for incentives, and with that, the company 
will realize the benefit of higher efficiency.  They believe that the need for performance-based 
pay lies in the company’s or organization’s need for goal attainment, whether monetary or some 
other measure.   
 Additionally, in an online article from the Colorado State University Cooperative 
Extension, Agriculture and Business Management, entitled “Labor Management: Issues and 
Strategies for Incentive Pay Programs,” the competitive prospective is examined with respect to 
the environment of unskilled, low paid, migrant workers.  The authors state the primary reason a 
business would introduce performance-based pay is productivity.  They also state that the 
worker’s ability to produce, above and beyond a predetermined set standard, affects the 
company’s bottom line.  This is the paramount consideration in introducing performance-based 
pay (Pg 1). 
Economic Perspective 
 Workers react to incentives.  When incentives are attached to increased production, 
employees identify that as a way to enhance their compensation and work to attain set goals.  
The economic perspective introduces the concept of change based on the need of employees for 
economic gain.          
 Iris Bohnet and Susan Eaton in the book, “For the People,” Chapter 13, Does 
Performance Pay Perform? Conditions for Success in the Public Sector, introduce the economic 
perspective.  They state that the federal government, over the past decade, has been debating the 
issue of introducing performance-based pay into the government (Pg 1).  The authors describe 
the need for the system from a purely economic perspective, by stating that if employee pay is 
tied to output in a proportional way, workers will work harder, and the greater output produced, 
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the more compensation earned (Pg 2). They continue by advising that the concept of merit pay is 
derived from scientific management, where there is a most efficient way to do each job, and the 
employee is motivated, by external forces, to do the job more efficiently (Pg 2).  The authors use 
scientific reasoning to indicate the motivation behind the implementation of performance-based 
pay and the need for incentives.  They present the argument that employees perform better when 
incentives are offered, and that companies use these incentive to achieve their ultimate goals (Pg 
2).   
 The authors of the Colorado study, in the same manner, express the view that the 
economic perspective is a viable reason for change.  They explain that performance-based 
incentives provide potential benefits including lowing employee turnover and improving 
employee morale (Pg 1).  Additionally, they state that in agriculture, hiring seasonal workers is a 
necessity, and with that, the employee pool comes with diverse worker capabilities.  The 
introduction of incentives, as postulated by the authors, can mitigate the diversity issue and 
enhance the possibility of hiring the best workers (Pg 1).  The reasoning is that more motivated 
employees, those who understand that the harder you work the more money there is to be made, 
will naturally gravitate to those companies that utilize pay based on performance and will 
increase their income. 
The Government Perspective 
 Within the government there are forces that drive the movement to performance-based 
pay systems.  The need for more responsive government and government accountability, are 
among those.  The government perspective is an amalgam of how government views the need for 
the change to performance-based pay.   
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 The government has studied the implementation of performance-based pay for some 
time, and as a practical matter, has participated in performance-based pay schemes.  Therefore, 
government has its own perspective on the implementation of performance-based pay.  That 
perspective is represented first in a report from the United States General Accounting Office, 
Human Capital: Implementing Pay for Performance at Selected Personnel Demonstration 
Projects, in which the GAO strongly supports the implementation of performance management 
systems, finding that its demonstration projects implemented operationally effective alternative 
pay systems using a variety of performance-based designs (Pg 4).  The organization has engaged 
in the study of such pay schemes, on a limited basis, but encompassing a diverse array of 
projects.  GAO has found that the use of incentives, if tailored to the organizational culture, will 
result in a positive outcome for the organization, and will lead to better efficiency (Pg 4).   
 Another illustration of the government perspective can be found in a summary report on a 
forum sponsored by the National Academy of Public Administration and the National 
Commission on Public Service (NCPS), “Conversations on Public Service; Performance-Based 
Pay in the Federal Government: How do we get there,” the forum participants advocated the 
continued implementation of performance-based pay systems in the public sector, stating that 
while the differences in organizational missions, employee pay, and skill levels throughout the 
government are hurdles, the federal government has the ability to implement a functional 
performance-based pay system if the proper ground work is completed ( Pg 4-5).  This statement 
reflects the belief of the Academy that the use of performance-based pay is integral to the 
effective operation of the government, and that it is possible to overcome current problems and 
implement a workable system.   
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 The forum participants then discussed several examples of government initiatives, which 
they believe solidify performance-based pay in the future of the federal workforce.  They explain 
that individual agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the General Accounting Office have instituted 
various forms of performance pay schemes.  Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security 
is in the process of implementing a performance-based pay system (Pg 6).  Additionally, they 
advise that Congress has authorized the Department of Defense to implement a performance pay 
system for 300,000 of its civilian employees, and the current Bush Administration has also 
proposed the creation of a 500 million dollar, Human Capitol Performance Fund, to give federal 
agencies the ability to compensate their top performers (Pg 6). The forum participants believe 
that with these initiatives, more than half the federal workforce, excluding the Postal Service, 
will be working in a performance-based pay system within the next two years (Pg 6-7).   
 In addressing additional aspects of the government perspective, a report by the Human 
Resources Management Panel (HRMP) of the National Academy of Public Administration, 
“Recommending Performance-Based Federal Pay,” states that the General Schedule is outdated, 
and that for the government to continue to both hire and retain high performers the 
implementation of a performance-based pay system is imperative (Pg 4-5). The basis of the 
panel’s belief is that the government, through the General Schedule’s rigid and highly structured 
policies, is at a disadvantage when attempting to hire and retain valuable human resources.  The 
panel furthers suggests that a system, which allows government organizations some latitude in 
hiring salaries and positions will be more effective and function better.  
 The ultimate success of a performance-based pay system is contingent on a large number 
of variables, from proper implementation procedures, to effective management, and 
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organizational attitude toward change.  The research has examined the most significant variables, 
and presents them as three general tenets.  
Organizational Impact 
 While it is important for any new system to fit the organizational structure, that is 
especially true for performance-based pay systems.  The increased apprehension that 
accompanies new compensation schemes must be mitigated by insuring proper alignment with 
organizational goals and strategies before implementation occurs. The tenet of organizational 
impact encompasses the belief that any change must fit within the current organizational 
construct.   
 In a paper by the International Labour Office, Geneva, entitled “Performance–Related 
and Skill Based Pay: An Introduction,” Sriyan de Silva explains the importance of this tenet 
when he states that before the shift of an organization to a performance based pay scheme, a 
company pay expert, or management in general, must analyze the existing pay structure and 
ensure that changes in compensation would not negatively impact company strategies, its overall 
organizational objectives, or its human resource management (Pg 5).  Here de Silva forwards the 
idea that the organization must be prepared for change, and that any change must fit within the 
organizational construct.  
 Additionally, in an internet article from Advantage Home, February 2005, Volume 1, 
Issue 10, “Measurable Goals, Clear Communication Key to Performance-Based Incentive 
Programs,” the RSM McGladrey Company continues to examine the principles of organizational 
impact.  The article cites a 2004 study by WorldatWork, a not for profit trade association, 
concerning the overall success of performance-based pay systems, which showed that of the 
companies utilizing performance-based pay, 83% described their programs as “somewhat 
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successful (Pg 1).” The article then presented a concept to lessen the possibility of implementing 
a dysfunctional system.  The use of Strategic Consistency, or insuring a new incentive plan fits 
within the overall strategy of the company (Pg 1-2), was presented as a significant way to ensure 
a functional merit pay system.  In other words, understanding the company’s short and long-term 
goals, and the future effects of the performance-based scheme on those goals, is a paramount 
consideration.  
  In the National Commission on Public Service study clear communication and a linkage 
between organizational goals and individual performance measures were deemed important (Pg 
8).  The study panel recommended that the system be implemented with an understanding of the 
mission and culture of the organization.  The systems should be tailored to fit the unique 
organizational structure.  
 To that end, the panel participants suggested two processes that could be used for 
effective implementation. The first is incremental implementation of the new system, agency by 
agency, over time.  The second more radical process would involve changing the system across 
the entire federal government all at once, including the total abolishment of the current civil 
service system (Pg 16).  In relation to the implementation choices, the forum participants noted 
that while some organizations are ready for change, others, due to organizational culture, need 
more time to adjust.  The NCPS forum recommended using a combination of both processes in 
order to facilitate a smooth transition. The concept of incrementalism versus radical change gives 
the tenet of organizational impact a new prospective.  The ideas presented offer management 
different, but equally effective ways, if the implementation process is fitting for the organization, 
to effect change and ensure the new system is functional.   
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 In the Colorado State University article, the authors examine organizational impact as it 
relates to the agricultural industry.  They state that a new system must be based on the 
company’s unique operating, marketing and financial objectives, including the concepts of 
expected market share, growth, and quality (Pg 2).  Here again the idea that the system must fit 
within an organization’s parameters is examined, and it becomes clear that any change must be 
preceded by an examination of the ultimate organizational impact. 
Communication    
 The inability, or worst, the unwillingness to communicate in an organization can have 
disastrous effects.  For a system to remain effective, the flow of ideas must continue.  The tenet 
of communication is based on the ideas that management and employees must engage in ongoing 
dialogue to ensure a new system is successful.   
 In relation to communication, de Silva points out that the objectives of a new system 
should be clearly identified, and that employees should have an input in determining whether 
those proposed objectives could be achieved via the new system (Pg 5).  In relation to the 
operation of the system, de Silva communicates that all changes in the workplace that 
accompany the new system must be identified and that the new system must be introduced to the 
stakeholders (Pg 6).  These concepts for the effective implementation of a new pay system are 
important.  They set the ground rules for how change will occur, and in doing so make changes 
easier for those involved.  de Silva also makes the point that stakeholder involvement in the 
process is a major factor.  Change is naturally difficult, but the ability to have input and influence 
the changes lessons its untoward effects (Pg 6).  In a paper by Yves Emery, “In Rewarding Civil 
Service Performance through Team Bonuses: Findings, Analysis, and Recommendations,” 
Emery includes the significance of employee buy in, and he goes further by espousing a system 
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that is openly communicated, that ties performance to rewards in a clear manner, and that also is 
complex enough to cover the gamut of responsibilities (Pg 161).  The authors of the Colorado 
study, in relation to communication, state that gaining the input of long- term workers, even 
those who are seasonal but return year after year, can give an indication on what factors are 
important to them, and in turn will add validity to the system (Pg 2).  Finally, the authors propose 
that once the standards are set, it is important to adequately monitor progress, through open 
communication, to ensure the system is working as designed (Pg 3-4).  Even in the environment 
of low paid, migrant workers, the fundamentals remain.  The concepts of stakeholder buy in, 
including providing input from the workers, fit within the communication tenet.  In an Internet 
article from CIPD, “Team Rewards, Pay and Reward,” the article provides some of the same 
communication fundamentals. The authors propose that for a performance-based pay system to 
function, every member of the group must understand and accept the goals set forth in the system 
(Pg 3).  That is, as discussed earlier, the stakeholders must “buy in” to the ultimate motivation 
and process contained in a new pay system.  The NSPS panel also touts the tenet of 
communication by stating that any new system must be properly communicated to the 
stakeholders (Pg 9). The panel then presents some new ideas. They first propose that the 
involvement of top-level management and individual employees in the system is paramount to a 
systems acceptance (Pg 9).  The point being, that only through the acceptance of the upper 
management, and their drive of the system, can individual employees have the ability to provide 
input.  The HRMP panel further states that in establishing a performance management system, 
that communication from the employees and management is central to the development of a 
functional system (Pg xi).  They state that the core of performance-based compensation is the 
ability of managers and employees to work together to define performance standards and ensure 
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the fairness of the process (xiii).   Here again is an illustration that communication, the ability of 
management and the employees to work together, is one of the core concepts of a functional 
system. 
Performance Recognition 
 For a performance-based pay system to be effective, it must accomplish what it proposes, 
and recognize performance.  The tenet of performance recognition entails the concepts that the 
new system will adequately identify high performing individuals, but will also address the lack 
of performance in others. 
 In the Internet article from Advantage Home, two concepts are introduced that the 
authors believe are central to performance recognition; Structural Integrity, that is, insuring that 
the performance goals within the system will be able to give a true account of the individual 
employee’s performance, and Cultural Relevance, insuring the incentive program within the 
system fits into the companies overall rewards structure (Pg 1-2). Both involve the ability of the 
system to measure and reward employees as a result of their performance.  They involve the 
system’s ability to function as prescribed.  
 Emery also explains the performance recognition tenet.  He states that for the 
performance incentives to be attractive to workers they must be positively viewed and of 
sufficient quantity, in excess of 10% more then currently offered (Pg 160).  Emery also states 
that there must be a clear link between performance achieved and reward allocation, this point is 
especially salient in the public arena (Pg 160).  Emery also postulates that the visibility of 
rewards, a subject that is vehemently controlled in private firms, must be included in the public 
sector in order to establish and continue the legitimacy of the system (Pg 161).  Additionally, the 
clear link between individual, team, and organizational objectives must be established in order to 
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ensure congruency within the process, and the performance measure must be complex, yet 
transparent, in order to allow for understanding but not manipulation (Pg 161).  Here Emery 
advances the concepts that performance recognition is more than a rating on a form, but that 
there is a quantifiable percentage that must be met.  Additionally, Emery explains that the 
performance recognition must be visible, that is, all employees should know what rewards are 
given.  Emery also states that the clear link between performance and rewards are important, and 
that in the end a congruency of goals, in addition to a functional performance measure, are 
central to a functional system.  In the CIPD article, the authors also state that rewards must be 
clearly linked to effort and achievement, that performance measures must be fair and consistent, 
and that the pay scheme must be carefully designed to incorporate monitoring of the program, 
attainable goals, and clarity (Pg 3).  Here again, the concepts that effect performance recognition 
are clear.   
 The NSPS panel also discussed performance recognition, but from a different 
perspective.  The panel stated that the availability of development and training for poor 
performers, and the necessity of holding managers accountable for performance-based 
management, must be included in any system (Pg 14-15).  With regard to poor performers, the 
panel states that a merit pay system, while it needs to reward the best and brightest, must also 
provide an instrument to assist those employees who are failing to reach their potential.  The 
panel also explains that, as with most performance pay systems, the first line supervisors are the 
catalysts.  In order for a system to function properly, the managers at the operational level, must 
be properly trained and held accountable.  In this change of perspective, negative performance 
actions are examined.  This is a particularly salient point in the public sector.  In the General 
Schedule there are instruments to deal with poor performers, but the management of the system 
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has rendered those instruments useless.  It the responsibility of a performance-based pay system 
to promoted those who perform, but it is equally important for the system to address the poor 
performers.  
 The examination of the literature has resulted in the recognition that organizational 
change is a key to the implementation of a performance-based system.  The concept of 
organizational change should not be confused with organizational impact, an issue that has 
already been addressed.  Organizational change refers those issues within an organization that 
must be changed, and ways to implement those changes, before implementation can occur.  The 
literature has illuminated two aspects of organizational change. 
Communication of Change 
 When change is imminent, the need for communication becomes that much more 
important.  All stakeholders must understand the needs for change, and have the opportunity to 
provide input.  Communication of change addresses the exchange of ideas between management 
and employees as that change occurs. 
 The HRMP panel discusses the importance of communication and organizational change.  
They explain the proper steps to implement a new system, explaining that the organization must 
first introduce the idea of change, explain the significance and need for the change, and 
ultimately present an acceptable system to the supervisors and employees (Pg 30-31).  This is 
difficult given the organizational culture in most government agencies.  For many agencies, the 
concepts included in performance-based pay schemes seem incongruent with their organizational 
missions.  For example, in the case of the Department of Homeland Security, how can 
investigating terrorist organizations, a convoluted concept to begin with, be tied to a performance 
measure?  This separation between mission outcome and individual pay is a major concern for 
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the public workforce and the introduction of performance-based pay.  In addition, the dismay 
that accompanies all change, even more so when that change addresses drastic modifications 
involving compensation, can easily overwhelm an organization and lead to adverse reactions. 
 To mitigate the effects of this adverse action, or culture shock, the panel poses that in 
order to truly facilitate organizational acceptance, a “psychological contract” must be established 
between supervisors and staff (Pg 12).  This contract, which is unwritten, establishes the 
acceptable behaviors for members of each group as to the implementation and management of a 
new pay system.  The point here is the importance of the employees’ belief that they well be 
treated fairly and that all involved will conduct themselves appropriately.  Additionally, the 
GAO states that organizational change should include the use of a new management system that 
perpetuates this new culture, including the concept of top-down management to support effective 
communication throughout the organization (Pg 3).  In these ideas on organizational change, 
there are some of the same ideas presented as tenets for success, yet in the present context the 
ideas precipitate an understanding of the changes needed in the organizational culture of most 
governmental agencies. 
Employee and Management Based Change 
 For change to occur, all stakeholders, management, employees, and the organization as a 
whole, must accept the need for change, and engage in change themselves. Employee and 
management based changed incorporates all the changes that must be engaged in by the members 
of an organization in preparation for the implementation of a new system. 
 de Silva contends that the concept of seniority, as a measure of compensation, is 
becoming less important, and that an individual’s presence in the workplace year after year is not 
an accurate measure of their performance (Pg 11).  Instead, the concept of seniority is being 
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replaced with more knowledge and performance based measures (Pg 12).  Incumbent in that 
divergent shift is the understanding that such changes in performance measures must be 
accompanied by the behavioral changes in employees and a shift in the way employees perceive 
their work.  The pervasive culture of seniority, the belief in many organizations that having “time 
on the job” entitles an individual to certain treatment, and that the person’s performance is based 
on that seniority, must be changed.  Cultural shifts can occur, but only through proper training 
for employees and management.  The GAO forum, in discussing employee change,  also states 
that in order to cultivate this cultural evolution, in preparation for the implementation of 
performance-based pay, the mentality of government employees towards their work, and as a 
consequence, a change in the overall culture of government employment is essential (Pg 1).  
Here we see the idea that the change to a new system must be preceded by the change in 
mentality of government workers, and that change must involve a meaningful understanding on 
behalf of the employees that for the system to be implemented properly, they must accept 
organizational change.  The GAO study stated that any functional performance-based pay system 
had to be created within a results oriented management scheme, a scheme which takes into 
account the outcomes or outputs of its employees (Pg 39).  This type of management scheme 
stands in stark contrast to the current entitlement based management culture so ingrained in the 
federal government.  As presented here, an understanding of the issue involving cultural change, 
from both employees and management, gives insight into the importance of those changes in 
preparation for a new system. 
 The manner in which a performance-based pay schemes evaluate employee performance 
is of great consequence.  The evaluation system must be easily understandable and clearly 
communicated, and must include an element of transparency.  In the examination of the 
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literature, the concept of evaluation was discussed as a major element in a successful 
performance-based pay system.  The literature presents three factors of evaluation. 
Evaluation Instruments 
 Evaluation instruments refer to the mix of measures used in the actual evaluation of 
employees within a performance-based pay system.  It involves the concept of using subjective 
measures for evaluation.  
 de Silva proposes that the use of highly structured evaluation tools to determine pay, does 
not allow for needed flexibility, in that, it is based on a standardized measures (Pg 15). That is, 
that an evaluation process should allow the evaluator to use a means, other than standardized 
evaluation, to measure employee performance.  This is necessary due to the diversity of 
employees who perform different duties.  Here de Silva forwards the idea that the use of an 
evaluation process that does not limit management to a matrix containing standardized, 
objective, judgments is more functional in determining the true contributions of the individual 
employee.  de Silva posits that the use of an evaluation process that allows these types of 
subjective measures, although opened to more interpretation, gives the organization the needed 
flexibility to properly evaluate performance.   
Evaluation System   
 Evaluation systems are complex.  This stems from the fact that they must encompass 
many different work classifications, insuring fairness, while making adjustments as the system 
evolves.  Evaluation systems include the basis for the systems, the effects that modifications can 
have, and the trust and legitimacy issues involved in an effective system.  
 In a paper by Saundra J. Reinke, Augusta State University, “Does the Form Really 
Matter?  Leadership, Trust, and Acceptance of the Performance Appraisal Process,” Reinke 
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begins the discussion on evaluation systems and the basis on which they operate.  She states that 
the utilization of performance systems is based on three critical assumptions.  First, employees 
differ in their contributions to the organization, secondly, the cause of this difference is due to 
their individual performance, and finally the supervisors are actually able and willing to 
distinguish an employee’s performance based on a known number of factors (Pg 23).  Here 
Reinke postulates the idea that evaluation systems are constructed around three central ideas, and 
states that based on those ideas being constant, the system will operate effectively. While these 
concepts are clear as they relate to the operation of an evaluation system, Reinke postulates that a 
fourth concept, legitimacy, plays a much more significant role in the acceptance of an evaluation 
system.  For while the aforementioned concepts play a functional role, legitimacy, or the 
acceptance of the appraisal system by the supervisors and employees, is essential to the 
comprehensive implementation of the merit based pay plan (Pg 23-24).   
 Reinke then examines two additional concepts that impact an evaluation system, trust and 
relationship between employees and supervisors.  In relation to trust, Reinke states that the 
employee/supervisor relationship is based on trust, and although she examines different 
definitions of trust, in the end, she defines trust as a belief that one can be counted on to act in an 
acceptable manner, with stability and order, and with open communication (Pg 26-27).  Reinke 
also conducted a study involving the concept of trust and employee reaction to the 
implementation of a new evaluation system.  Rainke’s population was given a survey to 
determine the attitudes of the employees toward their current evaluation system, in anticipation 
of a change to a new system.  The findings of the survey showed that the employees and 
managers were unhappy with the current system and that they had their own ideas about the 
implementation of a new system (Pg 27).  This information, as well as other data from the 
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survey, was then run through statistical analysis.  The result of that analysis showed that the 
concepts of trust and leadership were paramount determinants in the acceptance of a 
performance appraisal system.  In her examination of the trust concept and in the outcome of her 
study, Rainke shows that the tenets of the trust in relationships, in combination with the 
legitimacy of the system, results in a functional evaluation system.    
 In their examination of evaluation systems, Beer and Cannon, discuss the inherent 
problem of modifications to evaluation system.  They state that these modifications are 
precipitated by technology, learning curves, and changing circumstances, and can lead to the 
perception of inequity and reduce the validity of the link between pay and performance (Pg 5).  
Here the authors point to the problem of changing certain aspects of the evaluation system as a 
result of system evolution. While change is inevitable as the system evolves, the more important 
issue, and the issue that if addressed can mitigate the negative effects of change, is that the 
rationale and need for change must be understood by management, and must be clearly explained 
to the employees.   
 de Silva then comments on evaluation systems, yet he takes a different approach by 
examining inappropriate appraisal systems.  He states that these systems are those in which the 
objectives of the appraisal system do not match the objectives of the performance pay system (Pg 
16-17).  That is, the appraisal system’s construction, including the measures, does not meet the 
needs of the overall performance pay system.  In this situation, de Silva believes that the 
incongruence leads the employees to believe that the system has not been properly structured, 
and thus can lead to distrust in the evaluation process.  This idea is important to the 
understanding of the evaluation process.  With the introduction of a new pay system, 
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stakeholders will, by nature, be hesitant. It is important that the evaluation system, which drives 
the merit pay system, be free from unclear and incongruent principles. 
Evaluation Measures 
 The measures used in the evaluation process can affect the legitimacy of the outcome.    
Therefore, it is paramount that the measures fit the work that is being evaluated. Evaluation 
measures include, among other issues, a discussion of evaluating complex tasks, the connection 
between measures and job classifications, and ways to ensure the measurements of employee 
outputs are evaluated correctly.   
 Bohnet and Eaton begin the discussion on evaluation measures by exploring the problems 
in measuring more complicated tasks, as opposed to simple jobs.  They state that as employees 
are placed in a position to complete complex projects, and are responsible for multiple tasks, a 
detrimental effect on overall performance occurs from incentive based schemes (Pg 4).  They 
attribute the effect to the fact that those employees who are responsible for not only piece work, 
but more complex assignments, for example, developing new ideas or concepts, will ultimately 
concentrate their time on the completion of the more simplistic work leaving no time for the 
complex assignments.  This point is evidenced by the concept of higherarcy of tasks.  A worker 
sets the priority of tasks and attempts to complete those tasks in the proper order.  Intuitively, a 
conscientious worker will complete the easiest work first. However, tasks expand to fill time and 
the worker, no matter their motives, has difficulty completing the later, complex tasks. Here the 
authors explain the importance of work type as it applies to evaluation measures, and make the 
point that measures must be congruent with level of the work being evaluated.   
 The authors then discuss the subject of measuring employee outputs.  They state that 
there are three key characteristics in determining the applicability of output measurement.  The 
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output is based on a single task; here the idea of a single task is important, for when employees 
are evaluated for the completion of multiple responsibilities, and some of the duties are more 
easily observable and measurable, the workers will concentrate on those tasks (Pg 5).  Secondly, 
the task must be clearly measurable (Pg 5); this is important due to the fact that in the absence of 
clear measures, the authors contend a moral hazard arises (Pg 7).  In that, the employer, unable to 
evaluate based on a true measure, must base the evaluation of some random outcome that may, 
or may not, be linked to employee effort. Lastly, the measured task must be linked to a single 
individual (Pg 5).  This is important in that the evaluation measure must have the ability to 
differentiate the input of a diverse group of employees, with diverse abilities.  The authors then 
examine the notion that performance-based pay systems are most successful when implemented 
in non-professional environments, where output can be easily measured (Pg 7).  They give the 
examples of number of phone calls answered in a given period, or number of heads of lettuce 
picked, duties that are easily quantifiable.  They point out, however, that while best suited for 
non-professional occupations, performance-based pay schemes are used to a great extent in the 
highest level of employees, corporate CEO’s (Pg 7).  The authors state that although the efforts 
of CEO’s are difficult to measure and thus hard to incorporate into performance pay, it has been 
the common practice to reward them with stock options (Pg 7). Consequently, the CEO’s profit 
if stock prices increase and lose if they decrease.  This is to ensure that they make decisions in 
the best interest of the company. However, in the end, a CEO’s pay is usually based on luck.  If 
the company thrives because of high oil prices, the CEO profits from the companies performance 
although he or she had no effect of the price of oil.  The authors then discuss measurement as it 
relates to the public sector specifically.  They state that output in the public sector is even more 
difficult to measure, explaining that outputs are more vaguely defined than in the private sector 
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(Pg 8).  They use the example of the U.S. Department of State, whose goal is to “Promote the 
long range security and well-being of the United States,” the author’s state, in relation to this 
goal, that any measurement would be ineffective at arriving at a performance goal (Pg 8).   
 In relation to evaluation measures, Beer and Cannon contend that there are several 
distinct barriers inherent to the proper function of a performance-based system and in their 
measurement components (Pg 4).  They state that the difficulty in evaluating performance when 
the measurement increments are small or fine distinctions are being made is a problem when 
measuring complex tasks (Pg 4-5).  They continue by advising that this can be mitigated 
somewhat by the use of an unambiguous measurement instrument, but also state that whenever 
complex tasks are being evaluated, the problem will persist.  Secondly, they espouse the idea that 
performance can, and often is, affected by factors that are not within the individual’s or group’s 
control (Pg 4).  This can be seen in environmental changes in certain businesses or 
interdependence on other parts of the organization.  Whatever the cause, it is difficult to hold 
persons accountable for issues over which they have no control, and this poses a problem for an 
evaluation measure.  Additionally, managers, as a function of their duties, need to make 
decisions based on their best judgment.  This is also problematic, according to the authors, in that 
many mangers do not feel comfortable in having to differentiate between their subordinates (Pg 
4).  The human factor in any relationship cannot be ignored, and most managers do not want to 
create a hostile work environment.  In this, managers will usually find a way to make the system 
work to the benefit of the majority of workers. 
 Finally, de Silva initiates his discussion on evaluation measures by introducing the 
concepts of dysfunctional measurement criteria. This type of measurement criterion is not 
functional due to the fact that it is difficult for either management, employees, or both, to 
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understand, communicate, or accept (Pg 12-13), and in the end is of no use.  He states that the 
inclusion of such a criterion has a negative effect on the legitimacy of the entire system, and 
causes questioning of the evaluation measure. 
 In examining the literature, the concept of rewards, both monetary and intrinsic, was 
explored by many of the authors.  This idea of rewards, including employee motivations, can be 
discussed from different perspectives, and is viewed differently by employees and employers.  
To the end, the literature provided three basic means to examine the concepts of rewards.  
Differential Rewards 
 Differential rewards are significant in that the concept of rewards is very convoluted.  
Within the rewards structure, there are delineations for intrinsic and extrinsic, public sector and 
private sector, and employee/employer considerations.              
 de Silva introduces the idea of differential reward systems and their effects on both  
organizations and employees.  He states that although it seems incongruent, an increase in 
employee rewards does not necessarily lead to higher operating cost for the organization (Pg 5).  
de Silva points out, that the use of intrinsic rewards, those rewards based on fringe benefits; the 
ability of the employees to reorganize work processes, attend training, be involved in decision-
making and goal setting, and having the opportunity for career development, are all recognized 
as motivational factors for employees to perform at higher levels with little or no additional cost 
to the organization (Pg 15-16).   
 Emery also examines the differential motivations for employee performance and states 
that intrinsic rewards, those feelings of accomplishment one gets from completing or engaging in 
a task, are much more important and longer lasting than extrinsic rewards, monetary or otherwise 
(Pg 159).  de Silva postulates that the use of monetary incentives alone may only have an effect 
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on employee performance for a short period of time, but a system that incorporates both intrinsic 
and monetary components is more likely to affect the performance of employees, and the 
organization, over the long run (Pg 13).  As an example, de Silva points to a study by Gerald E. 
Ledford, Edward Lawson, and Susan Mohrman, which showed that of a sample drawn from 
fortune 500 companies, the most widely used rewards for employee performance, over 90%, was 
non-monetary rewards (qtd in Creating High Performance).   
 Emery also discusses the issue of differential motivation between private and public 
workers by stating that public workers are not motivated by the monetary rewards as their 
corporate counterparts, but that public workers are motivated more by the possibility of making 
decisions, having a stable future, and putting their knowledge to work (Pg 160-161).  Emery 
concludes by stating that for incentive systems to be effective all levels must be involved; 
individual, teams, if applicable, agency, and organizational (Pg 163-164).  He states that for the 
successful implementation of a system, there must be diversification in the rewards that the 
system offers (Pg 164).  That is, the system must offer extrinsic financial incentives, those 
contingent on performance or acquired skills, and intrinsic non financial incentives, those that 
offer a feeling of accomplishment so important to workers in the public sector. 
 The HRMP also found that differential rewards were a factor in the dichotomy in pay 
philosophy that exists between the public and private sector, discussing the fact that federal 
employees are given regular and significant pay raises at the start of their careers, before most 
have the knowledge and ability to positively affect their organizations, while the private sector 
awards significant pay increases as an employee progresses in their career and acquires the 
knowledge and skills that benefit the company (Pg 9-10).  The panel believes that this dichotomy 
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in management theory indicates that the public sector places less emphasis on compensation 
based on actual skill and knowledge, and is more concerned with rewards for longevity.  
Meaningful Rewards   
 Meaningful rewards are the basis for any performance-based pay system.  Before the 
system can be implemented to encourage employees to produce at higher levels, it must offer the 
proper motivation.  The inclusion of meaningful rewards is central to that function.  
 In the NCPS report, the forum discussed the use of meaningful rewards.  The members 
focused on monetary rewards and agreed that managers must have sufficient resources allocated 
to pay employees for their performance at significant levels. Members stated that if an employee 
is going to be evaluated by predetermined objectives, within a recognized and standardized 
system, the pay they receive as a result should be meaningful (Pg 14).  Fernie and Metcalf found, 
that in relation to performance-based pay, the larger proportion of an employee’s salary that is 
comprised of incentives, the higher their performance will be (Pg 4).  That is, the higher the 
employee’s pay is based on incentives, the more motivation the employee has to perform.   
The NCPS then espoused the idea that base salary is important factor in meaningful rewards.  
They stated that while the use of one time awards, awards given on a single occasion and in lieu 
of base salary increases, should be incorporated into a performance-based pay system, employees 
are concerned, and rightly so, as to how their continued performance effects base salaries (Pg 
14).  In this, the panel believes it is important that a functional rewards system have a mixture of 
one time performance rewards, based on an employee’s isolated performance outcomes and 
overall performance, in combination with base salary increases.   
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Reward Motivation    
  Motivation is important to any discussion on rewards.  It is central to the belief that 
individuals will work harder, perform better, if a proper motivating factor is introduced. 
Motivation is also the key to performance pay.  For a system to function, to actually motivate 
employees to achieve increased productivity, there must be that motivational factor.    
 Bohnet and Eaton agree that employees are motivated by rewards.  They state that 
incentives, other than money, have a more motivating effect in many cases (Pg 10).  As they 
explore the subject further, the authors refer to Douglas McGregor’s ideas and concepts on 
worker motivation.   Mcgregor’s “Theory X’”, states that employees are adverse to effort and 
would prefer not to work at all if they could get away with it.  This leads to the need for 
incentives to motivate employees to attain the goals for the good of the company. Theory X 
postulates an intrinsic aversion to work, and states that workers need incentives, motivations, to 
accomplish any task. Mcgregor also postulates that “Theory Y,” which assumes that most people 
like to work, gain a psychic and financial reward from working, and want to do a good job, is a 
more beneficial way of conceptualizing the worker psyche, and is a better base to implement 
incentive pay.  Although the authors explore both divergent theories, the importance lies in the 
fact that they believe employee performance is affected by the factors of motivation and 
incentives (Pg 33-57).   
 Beer and Cannon continue the discussion on motivation as it relates to the debate over the 
nature of human beings and their motivations, including the various arguments for and against 
the use of incentives.  In relation to incentives, they believe that individual workers respond 
constructively to financial incentives, and thus the worker’s behavior, their performance, can be 
controlled by extrinsic incentives (Pg 3). The authors then address traditional compensation 
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plans, those systems that offer compensation of monthly or weekly wages with no built in 
incentives.  The authors argue that the systems are detrimental to their organizations in that they 
inhibit attempts to establish a more competitive, adaptive, and collaborative work environment 
(Pg 3).  It is important to separate the concepts of incentive driven, performance pay, from 
salaried pay systems, and understanding that while salaried compensation provides a steady rate 
of form of payment, the use of performance incentives allows the organization latitude in 
compensation and allows employees, through motivation, the ability to increase their earnings.  
Beer and Cannon then look to additional scholars that believe merit pay, and the use of 
incentives, is inherently dysfunctional.  These authors, including Kohn, Amabile, and Meyer, 
propose that incentive systems, and the motivation they produce, are theoretically flawed, they 
also believe that individuals do not respond to incentives in predictable ways, and thus any 
compensation system grounded on that premises is misguided (qtd in Kohn 54; Amabile 10; 
Meyer 39-50).  They also postulate that monetary incentives have a destructive affect on 
employee self worth, intrinsic motivation, and creativity.   They state that even if incentives do 
work as designed, and productivity is positively affected, the result is that the employees are 
more motivated by the possibility of gaining the reward than accomplishing other things that 
would enhance the organization (qtd in Kohn 54; Amabile 10; Meyer 39-50).  Here these 
scholars illuminate the idea that the concept of using incentives as motivation is ultimately 
detrimental to worker morale.  They propose that the impending positives of the system 
outweigh the negative results, and that the entire concept is flawed; yet they never discuss the 
use of intrinsic motivation.  While the authors agree that incentives can have a positive effect on 
employee performance, they also postulate that those same incentives can have negative results 
on employee morale and the ultimate success of the organization.  
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 The team concept involves the use of a group of individuals, all with diverse backgrounds 
and different capabilities, working as a unit to accomplish a single, or series, of projects. For a 
team to be successful, the members must have similar goals and must share a common focus. 
The literature explained that the use of teams has grown, and is now becoming an accepted 
practice in both the public and private sectors.  While teams can be examined from any number 
of perspectives, the literature provided for two: team incentives/awards and team functionality.  
Team Incentive/Awards 
 Team incentives and awards affect the motivation and ultimate success of a team in 
completing assigned tasks.  The literature discusses the team concept from the perspective of 
performance-based pay, including how particular incentive and award schemes effect the over 
team function.  While the teams are certainly driven by other factors, the type of incentives 
offered, especially within a merit pay system, can have effects on team cohesion and its overall 
function.      
 In the Colorado State article, the authors comment on the importance of team awards, and 
agree that the team should share in all incentives once goals are reached.  They postulate that no 
matter the type of incentive offered, all levels of the organization should share in the 
accomplishments (Pg 3).  That is, once the performance standard has been surpassed, not only 
the individual workers, but also the management and owners, should share in the rewards.  They 
feel that the shared incentives throughout the organization, including employees, management, 
and owners, provides congruency in goals and foster teamwork.  
 Sue Fernie and David Metcalf examine team awards and their relationship with merit 
based pay.  They first comment on individual performance-based pay schemes within the team 
concept, and state that an individual based incentive plan, one that recognizes individual effort, 
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lends itself to the problem of worker’s putting their concerns for increased earnings over the 
interests of the team (Pg 3). Here the authors expose the inherent problem with the utilization of 
individual based pay in the team environment.  Emery agrees with that summation as he states 
that many performance-based pay systems are implemented with a lack of financial resources, 
insufficient training for managers, and the intrinsic dichotomy of promoting team work while 
awarding individual performance (Pg 158).  
 The CIPD authors also address the issue of individual performance and its placement into 
the team concept. They advise that any incentives that are in place for the team may be affected 
by individual performance rewards (Pg 3).  They also postulate that individual, hierarchical, pay 
structures are inappropriate for teams, because they make it difficult to foster team spirit when 
individuals are concentrating on personal gain (Pg 4).  In the same vein, the CIPD authors tout 
the use of team incentives and question the utilization of individual incentives.  They explain that 
while team rewards reinforce proper teamwork, group cohesion, and encourage group endeavors, 
the use of individual rewards intuitively forces management to look at the team based on the 
individuals involved, and this inhibits the effectiveness of the team (Pg 5).  
 Fernie and Metcalf then espouse use of the team concept in not only completing tasks, 
but by incorporating incentives.  They stated that the use of the team concept should allow for 
incentive payments to workers based, not only on their personal performance, but also on the 
performance of the team (Pg 3-4).  They continue by predicting that the use of the team approach 
would be more effective than the individual approach in tying incentives to performance (Pg 12).  
In a study based on that prediction, the authors found that the use of performance-based pay, in 
itself, does not enhance productivity, but that the use of the team approach, coupled with 
individual and team incentives, does yield positive effects on performance (Pg 11-13).  That is, 
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the use of a performance-based pay scheme that incorporates both individual and team incentives 
delivers superior performance.  Bohnet and Eaton, as an alternative to individual incentives, 
promote the idea of a team reward system.  They propose a system that can effectively 
compensate the team members for their efforts and contributions as they relate to the 
accomplishment of team goals would be an effective alternative (Pg 9).  The authors also state 
the importance of such a system in mitigating the effects of the “free rider” problem, the 
dilemma in which certain members of a team fail to contribute and force others to do more (Pg 
9).  In these ideas on teams and incentives, we find the resounding notion that for the work of a 
group, or team to be fairly evaluated, it must be measured in relation to the team as a whole.  
Any attempt to judge team performance based on unassociated individual measures, clearly will 
have inherent problems of equity and will affect the team dynamic.   
Team Functionality 
 For a team to be functional, it must possess certain attributes.  The literature addresses the 
ideas of teams having shared goals and motivations, and the ability of a team to work together in 
a concerted effort.  In addition, the concepts of team stability, peer pressure, and other issues that 
effect team function are important to the overall success of the team concept.    
 Emery begins the discussion on team functionality by stating that the growing infatuation 
with teams, or groups, which began in the 1980’s, has become an accepted, and significant, way 
to accomplish goals (Pg 158).  Emery continues by espousing the collective action of groups 
over the ability of an individual, and he quotes studies that show that teams make decisive 
contributions to innovation, quality of service, cost reduction, and productivity (Pg 163).  The 
important point is that the team concept works to accomplish goals while having the ability to 
incorporate a wide array of ideas and abilities of diverse personnel.  Likewise, Fernie and 
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Metcalf agree with the value of the team concept when the postulate that the team approach 
internalizes performance norms through which each member expects and values fair treatment, 
and works for the good of the team and thus the good of the organization (Pg 10).  In CIPD 
article, the authors add that any team incentive should include some from of intrinsic award, for 
while monetary rewards are important, the recognition of the team at the completion of a project 
is more gratifying and more sought after (Pg 3).  These ideas are important in that they identify 
some of the core concepts of performance-based pay schemes and couple them with the belief 
that the use of a team will further develop these concepts and ingrain them in the organization. In 
further support of the functional team, Fernie and Metcalf point out that the team approach 
allows for peer pressure in avoiding the free rider problem (Pg 4).  The use of “peer pressure,” 
when employed by group members, maintains group norms and provides the ability to observe 
all aspects of the individual’s performance to ensure it is congruent with that of the organization.  
Another important point here is that the team concept controls the behavior of its members, 
which then leads to a group “buy in,” and the ultimate adaptation of the organization’s 
performance plan.  
 Emery then addresses some important ideas relating to the team concept.  He states that 
for a team to be truly functional they must be in a position to influence the result that they 
produce, that is, that there needs to be causality present for the team to feel it has accomplished 
something (Pg 161).  Additionally, Emery states that a clear link between individual, team, and 
organizational objectives must be established in order to ensure congruency within the process, 
and the performance measure must be complex, yet transparent, in order to allow for 
understanding, but not manipulation (Pg 161).  In these ideas, the use of the team concept, when 
coupled with the ideas contained in performance-based pay systems, provide an instrument for 
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the efficient management of an organization’s human resources.  To that end, Emery furthers the 
notion that the ultimate attainment of organizational goals is positively effected by the use of the 
team concept.  
 Funding is an essential element in the functional implementation and management of a 
performance-based pay system, for even if a system is structured properly, communication is 
open, the evaluation process is transparent, and all the other core tenets are in place, it will never 
function without bursary.  In much of the literature there was no mention of system funding, this 
is exceedingly true in the literature from the private sector.  It seems that the inclusion of the 
funding aspect of a new system, escapes the notice of private business.  It is understood, by the 
company and the employees, that any new system will be funded.  I think the notion is correct, 
for it would be ridiculous for a company to invest in a new pay system, including training and 
implementation costs, only to abandon it for lack of fiscal planning.  While this concept fits in 
the private sector, the public sector, government in particular, has an inherent problem with 
funding issues.  The literature examines these problems and offers some information on 
mitigating them. The concepts are expressed as preparation and limitations 
Funding Preparations and Limitations 
 Unlike organizations in the private sector, governmental organizations must compete for 
funding against one another.  This has led, and will always lead, to shortfalls in the funding for 
agency projects.  While the private sector utilizes market strategies to ensure fiscal viability, 
public sector organizations must rely on other, separate entities, for their fiscal concerns.  In 
essence, public organizations can initiate and implement new programs and systems, including 
performance-based pay, only to have funding for those initiatives withheld or completely denied 
       35
by Congress.  In the literature, for the most part, only government agencies point to funding as a 
major issue, and even then, they do not offer many solutions.  Funding preparation and 
limitations examines the concepts of funding, both exploring the outcomes of funding shortfalls 
and some ways to mitigate them.           
 Beer and Cannon discussed the issue of funding limitations and its effect on pay systems 
and employees, stating that very often there are limits on bonus payouts or shortfalls in overall 
funding, and that any failure to pay promised incentives is perceived by the employees as 
inconsistent with their agreed upon performance standards (Pg 5). In this we find two of the most 
important obstacles with funding.  The problem of limited resources to pay incentives is 
important in that once a system is implemented, the goals are set, the evaluation process is 
conducted, and an employee performs at a level to warrant an incentive payment, failure of the 
organization to actually pay the incentive is destructive to employee morale and detrimental to 
the legitimacy of the entire system.  The GAO study discussed the issue of funding preparation 
in mitigation of funding shortfalls and cited that the U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
reported that the increased cost of any alternative pay system should be budgeted for before its 
implementation (Pg 5). The GAO also advised in their demonstration projects, the direct cost of 
salaries, training, automation, and data systems were the major considerations when 
implementing their respective performance-based schemes, and budget adjustments were needed 
to address those items (Pg 5). The HRMP panel agrees with advanced funding preparation and 
believes that it is exceedingly important that agency budgets be set at levels that will allow the 
full funding of any new pay system, reasoning that, if on any occasion a system is not funded its 
legitimacy will be in question (Pg 27). This falls in line with the accepted reasoning behind 
budgeting for the system before hand.  In relation to the implementation of merit pay systems, 
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the panel stated that “agency salary budgets will be set at levels necessary to fully fund the pay 
systems (Pg 26).” That is, government agencies budget for expenses on an annual basis, and it is 
paramount that their budgets allow for the payments of performance incentives.  Instinctively 
these considerations are significant, yet government funding for performance-based pay has 
always been an issue, and very often the problem is not recognized until payments are due.  The 
GAO then points to approaches used in their government demonstration projects using 
performance-based pay.  The GAO states some projects utilized annual, general pay increases 
and locality pay adjustments for funding (Pg 6).  The use of these types of funding streams can 
be effective, the basis being that those regular, annual, pay increases are automatic and thus the 
funds will always be available. The GAO also reports that other projects managed cost by 
considering fiscal conditions and the current labor market conditions in deciding the amount to 
budget for pay increases in the future (Pg 7).  This approach could also be effective for it 
incorporates planning in advance to ensure appropriate funding is provided.  In both these 
approaches, the GAO gives general approaches to managing funding, but makes no attempt at 
explaining the central problem of funding control. Public organizations do not control funding. 
Funding is the responsibility of Congress. 
 The use of pay banding, that is, the division of employees into bands, containing a 
maximum and minimum compensation rate, is a general concept in performance-based pay 
schemes applied in government organizations.  The bands range from novice, new hires with 
little experience, to senior expert, reserved for the most knowledgeable and experienced 
employees.  Employees, upon hire, are placed in a particular band based on job classification, 
experience, and other considerations.  As an integral element of a performance-based pay plan, 
pay bands provide that the employee is then meritoriously promoted through the bands, or 
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awarded compensation increases within the bands, as dictated by their performance.  The 
literature examines pay banding based primarily from a governmental perspective, and it is 
explored both as a functional system and through its implementation.    
System Function 
 Pay bands are an integral feature of performance-based pay.  They are utilized as the 
structure in which the merit pay systems operate, and can be examined as to their function and 
expected outcomes in supporting those systems.   
 In reference to pay banding and it being a functional replacement for the General 
Schedule, the NCPS forum concluded that narrowly defined pay structures like the General 
Schedule, that set specific perimeters for salaries based on a predetermined measure of time in 
grade, make it difficult for government organizations to compensate new employees on par with 
the private sector (Pg 11).  The HRMP agrees that the General Schedule is outdated, and that for 
the government to continue to both hire and retain high performers the implementation of a 
performance-based pay system is imperative (Pg ix). The NCPS suggest in replacement of the 
General Schedule utilizing six to eight broad pay bands, involving larger salary ranges within 
each successive band (Pg 13). They believe that the use of such a system will allow for the 
managers to have greater discretion in setting salaries based on the market and demand for 
certain skills. To that end, the HRMP also believes that the use of open salary bands will provide 
flexibility for agencies to manage their salaries, while being better able to support their 
individual human resource needs (Pg 4).  Both panels see pay bands as central to the operation of 
a performance-based pay scheme.   
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System Implementation 
 The way that pay bands are implemented in an organization can determine the ultimate 
acceptance and success of the merit pay system they are an element of.  Training is also an 
important aspect of implementation, especially as it relates to those charged with the functional 
management of the system.  In the system implementation, an approach to the proper 
implementation of pay bands is examined, along with the issue of training the managers that 
drive the merit pay system.  
 The HRMP panel addresses the implementation of pay banding and how it should be 
incorporated into government organizations.  The panel suggested initially aligning the new 
broad pay bands with the pay grades of the General Schedule, but over time using market pay 
trends for needed skill sets, to make adjustments (Pg 28).  The HRMP panel believes that this 
incremental approach will alleviate the initial discomfort that accompanies change.  The initial 
alignment of the pay bands with the General Schedule mitigates the negative, at least initial 
negative, results of the change over.  It allows employees to remain at their current salary and 
ease the change in over time.  In addressing training concerns as they apply to system 
implementation, the HRMP panel stated that adequate training must be provided to managers, 
and that it is important due to the tremendous role that managers play in the implementation 
process (Pg 6). For the sake of discussion, it seems likely that the same problems inherent in the 
General Schedule are present in pay banding.  The most glaring is the role of first line 
supervisors as the catalyst for the system.  The same managers that implemented the General 
Schedule, with its problems, will be the same mangers charged with the administration of pay 
banding.  This general statement on manager training is important, but it fails to offer solutions. 
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Important Case Studies   
 In an effort to understand performance-based pay issues within some context, and in 
further examining the Beer and Cannon Study and the GAO Study, it became clear that a full 
examination of the case studies, and the conclusions drawn from them, would enhance an 
understanding of how varying forms of merit pay systems operate in the public and private 
sectors.  While the case studies in the Beer and Cannon study are real world studies implemented 
and measured, the cases from the GAO are drawn from test projects and a more open to 
manipulation.  Beer and Cannon begin to discuss the case studies on performance-based systems, 
but first restated that management is the key to proper implementation, and that in the 
implementation phase, management usually fails to acknowledge the possible pitfalls and 
challenges leading to even larger issues (Pg 5-6).  
 With that in mind, in the mid-1990’s Beer and Cannon, had the opportunity to study the 
managerial experience of implementing performance compensation programs at thirteen Hewlett 
Packard sites.  At these sites, the managers had great discretion and autonomy in the 
implementation and evaluation of the systems (Pg 7).  In fact, if managers felt the cost and 
benefits were not proportional, they could cancel the programs at any time. Additionally, for the 
most part, groups engaged in blue-collar production work, with the exception of one group of 
engineers.  The performance based pay schemes were implemented based on the need for 
additional inducements to achieve goals, enhance learning and team behavior, and to provide 
additional compensation for increased spans of control brought on by restructuring.    
 Beer and Cannon were allowed the review documents and to interview managers who 
sponsored those incentive programs.  The incentive programs involved team and skill based pay 
systems, including profit sharing from group gains, cash incentives and bonuses (Pg 7). Of the 
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sites in the study, half were located outside the United States, spread throughout five countries.  
The authors also found it important, as I do, to place the study in context.  They advise that at the 
time, Hewlett Packard’s human resource management policies included the use of decentralized 
business units, a strong commitment to management by objectives, participative management, 
and delegation of responsibility to the lowest level, including extensive communication, 
recruitment and hiring policies focused on technical and interpersonal skills, and a career system 
based on internal promotion and cross-functional, or divisional movement (Pg 7-8).  The authors 
continue by reporting on five of the thirteen sites, and extrapolating their findings. 
 At the San Diego site, which initially utilized a performance-based pay system in which 
managers would divide work group objectives into individual assignments, monitor the 
individual contributions, and pay incentives on an individual basis, a new team pay for 
performance was established.  The new system was implemented to motivate performance and 
the achievement of work goals, such as team process improvement, production, and quality.  The 
system provided for teams of workers to be monitored as they attempted to achieve their set 
goals.  The system set three levels of pay increases, with no “take away” for failing to meet team 
goals (Pg 9).  With the achievement of level three, the highest level, group members received 
$150-$200 additional pay per month.  In addition, the new system had a component, Pay for 
Contribution, which allowed for additional compensation based on the employee’s ability to 
demonstrate competence in performing additional tasks within the group.  As the employees 
showed proficiency in a more diverse array of skills, their base salary was increased.  The 
reasoning was that this contribution component produced a continuously learning workforce 
capable of adapting to new situations.  After six months, the teams operated well within the 
system, with the majority outperforming goals and reaching the level II or III, yet with such a 
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high level of achievement, the company felt the original goals were set to low and modified the 
program (Pg 10).  The modifications met with resistance from the employees who had began to 
rely on the additional compensation, and this led management to conclude that the workers were 
concentrating on their pay and not the actual work (Pg 10).  In addition, management found that 
certain circumstances, outside the team’s control, had affected their performance, and that the 
teams began to engage in team exclusivity (Pg 11).   That is, the team would exclude any new 
member that they perceived as a weak link.  Relative to the Pay for Contribution, the workers felt 
that the program placed an inordinate amount of stress on them (Pg 11).  The need for testing and 
evaluation, coupled with the company’s initiation of lowering base pay for an unsatisfactory 
score during initial testing, ultimately culminated in the employees refusing to take on new tasks 
and the system becoming dysfunctional.  In the end, both the team performance and pay for 
contribution systems were discontinued after a year in the largest division, and at the whole site 
shortly thereafter.  The manager’s felt that the systems did little to motivate employees, and that 
the constant necessity of re-engineering the pay system to overcome continuing problems was 
too costly both in manpower and employee moral (Pg 11-12).  At this site, the problems 
discussed throughout the literature were realized.  The use of the team concept, while functional 
as to increased production, was affected by modifications in the system once implemented.  As 
well, the team’s practiced exclusivity and the effect of external factors on the team’s overall 
production were negative outcomes.  These unforeseen consequences of the team concept 
ultimately led to the demise of the entire system.    
 At the second site discussed, the Boise Print Shop, HP had recently switched to self-
managed teams, and management implemented a pay system, Skill Based Pay, which they felt 
would complement the individual and team performance (Pg 12).  The system allowed for 
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increased pay based on skill level if the team, and individuals, reached their performance 
objectives.  If the team was among the highest performers for the month, they received a bonus.  
If the team continued to perform well, above average, the individuals were allowed to pursue 
development and advancement to the next skill level, bringing enhanced compensation.  As 
stated earlier, the teams were designed to be self managing, therefore if a team experienced any 
performance problems, as determined by peers and management, its members were not allowed 
to seek new training opportunities until they were corrected.  The program was designed to 
provide additional pay without negative repercussions for lagging team performance.  The results 
of the system were similar to those in San Diego (Pg 13).  After months, teams received more 
performance based pay then expected by management.  As a result, although management 
attempted, they found it very difficult to reset the pre-established goals.  The teams, as 
experienced in San Diego, also engaged in exclusivity.  External factors also affected the 
ultimate goal accomplishments and caused problems with employee moral.  The self-
management portion of the system, in which management, as well as, peers judged performance 
proved too problematic as well.  The team members found it difficult to judge their peers.  If 
negative feedback was received, tempers flared, and in the end bad evaluations were attributed to 
ineffective measurement tools and the subjectivity of coworkers (Pg 13).  In the end, the system 
was dropped.  Managers decided that employees had become too focused on pay and less on 
tasks.  In this case there are some of the same issues already discussed.  However, the concept of 
self-management was examined.  Self-management in this context encompasses the same ideas 
as manager-worker issues.  The point here is that the human condition is constant, and that just 
as managers were adverse to documenting negative outcomes in performance, we see that peers 
have the same problems. 
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 PRCO Loveland was the next site examined.  The fabrication shop had been slow in 
reaching performance goals, and manager’s felt the utilization of performance incentives could 
increase production to 95% of their target output (Pg 13).  Managers implemented a bonus 
program in which everyone at the site would earn a performance bonus of $250 if the goal was 
reached (Pg 13).  In the end, the site failed to reach its goal and no bonuses were paid.  The 
workers showed no discontentment with this; though many felt insulted that the company had 
attempted to bribe them to work harder towards a goal they were already motivated to achieve 
(Pg 13).  Managers did state, however, that the bonus plan did highlight to the employees, 
management’s commitment to achieve the goal.  In the final analysis, the managers decided it 
would have been more effective to coach and train their employees in ways to achieve the 
production goals, then to offer the bonuses (Pg 13).  In this case, though not specifically referred 
to, the issue of intrinsic versus extrinsic rewards is apparent.  The workers felt “bribed” by the 
offer of monetary compensation to achieve a goal that they were intrinsically motivated to 
achieve.   
 The Colorado Memory Systems site, which was taken over by Hewlett Packard, had 
never utilized a profit sharing program. CMS management felt that allowing the new employees 
to benefit from the stock prices when the company was taken public would enhance performance 
(Pg 14).  Although the company was never taken public, CMS management attempted, but failed 
because of cost prohibitions, to implement the HP profit sharing system.  Instead, the company 
implemented a local gain-sharing program separate from HP.  The program’s goals were to 
increase individual initiative, individual responsibility, willingness to learn, team building, 
collaboration, willingness to confront conflict, and increased focus on attentiveness (Pg 14).  The 
program centered around bonuses, which would be paid on a quarterly basis, based on the 
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attainment of certain levels of operating profit.  In the end, management reported that the 
program increased visibility between departments, or the effective use of diverse teams to 
achieve goals, heightened awareness of business fundamentals and financials, clearly defined 
and communicated objectives, and created a uniformed company wide focus (Pg 14-15).  
However, the program also resulted in employee perception that the program was utilized to 
promote short-term behavior.  The employees also felt alienated from their new parent company 
because they were not afforded the same profit sharing as other HP employees (Pg 15).  In the 
end, management decided that the program’s failure to bring CMS employees even close to the 
compensation level of other HP employees, and the employee’s loss of confidence in the 
program as a result, was enough to discontinue its use (Pg 15).  The use of this type of incentive 
system is directly related to concept of meaningful rewards.  The use of any incentive system, as 
found in the literature, must be based in an award payment that is perceived as both fair and 
equitable.  In this case, the inability of CMS to offer the same level of incentive pay as HP led to 
a lack of equity, and a doubt as to the validity of the system itself. 
 The final site, The Workstation Group, was centered on the introduction of UNIX-based 
workstations in the 1990’s (Pg 15).  Performance with high technology products, and in the high 
technology arena for that matter, is contingent upon speed.  Management was therefore 
concerned that the UNIX product be completed, with high quality, and with all the support 
services established, in a timely manner.  With that, management attempted to motivate, in this 
case software engineers, to be more efficient and effective by the use of experimental pay.  This 
system offered two bonus packages, one for managers and the other for the engineers, both of 
which were to be paid after the completion of the project (Pg 15-16).  The performance goal was 
that the project would be completed by a preset target date. The mangers were offered cash and 
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stock option rewards due to the importance of their decision-making, and the engineers were 
offered cash incentives only.   
 The program was implemented for the short-term goal of completing the project, and 
managers would be paid their stock options six months after completion, in order to benefit from 
the expected positive effect on share prices as a result of the project (Pg 16).  Engineers would be 
paid their bonuses based on individual contributions as determined by a nomination and approval 
process upon project completion.  The project was completed six months ahead of schedule.  The 
success of the project may be attributed to the performance-based pay, however, management 
believes that the simple implementation of the plan communicated the project’s importance, and 
thus acted as an inherent motivating factor (Pg 16).  While 70% of the employees stated that they 
would have worked just as hard on the project had incentives not been offered, 60% stated that 
they would recommend the use of performance incentives on future projects (Pg 16).  In the final 
analysis, as stated by a local personal manager, the pay system was a great catalyst in the project 
(Pg 16).  In this case, the concept of using performance-based pay for complex tasks is 
exemplified.  The engineers were charged with completing a project that entailed a tremendous 
amount of abstract thought, complex skills, and mission specific knowledge, all of which, as 
discussed in the literature, can cause problems in the evaluation process.  In order to mitigate 
these potential problems, management used a simplistic incentive measure based not on 
individual performance, but on the team’s ability to complete a task.  Additionally, as espoused 
in the literature, this type of performance measure allows for the members of the entire 
organization to share in goal attainment. 
 Some of the significant findings Beer and Cannon discovered about performance-based 
pay in the Hewlett Packard experiments, are that team based environments tend to produce 
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increasing performance results, while the implementation of other alternative pay systems have 
not proven necessary to produce those same outcomes (Pg 17).  As a result, HP decided that its 
current pay system and other tools, were sufficient to support the work team environment.  
Furthermore, even though HP gained valuable organizational learning from alternative pay 
experiments, the resource commitment necessary to design and implement pay system, changes, 
and the limited return so far, indicates the HP does not need additional experiments unless they 
are markedly different (Pg 18).  
  In addition to those findings, the authors point out that the managers in the study had 
difficulty in relating level of performance to compensation at the operational level.  The cause in 
some ways is due to the subjective nature of measurement.  In the end, managers concluded that 
they could achieve the same result with proper coaching and the use of other management tools 
(Pg 19).  The need to make adjustments to the system also proved problematic.  Once 
performance levels are set, any change has a negative effect on legitimacy.  Additionally, if the 
workforce is constantly expecting additional pay for additional progress it is intuitive that 
problems may result. 
 In continuing on to the case studies provided by the GAO, it is important to stress that 
these studies are somewhat controlled by their very nature.  However, they offer some very 
progressive concepts in relation to functional performance-based pay schemes in the public 
sector.  The projects included: the Navy Demonstration Project at China Lake (China Lake), the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Department of Commerce (DOC), 
the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), the Naval Sea Systems Command Warfare Center 
(NAVSEA), and the Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project 
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(AcqDemo).  These demonstration projects were diverse in their respective missions, personnel, 
and organizational culture.  
  In that diversity, the projects were able to test the functionality of a number of pay 
schemes.  The demonstration projects utilized different concepts as they implemented their 
respective performance-based pay systems.  With respect to measuring employee competencies, 
AcqDemo decided to evaluate its employees against one set of factors utilized across the 
organization (Pg 10).  AcqDemo also used “Discriminators” and “Descriptors”, two tools that 
help define the performance factors (Pg 10).  The project used six factors in determining 
employee performance, problem solving, teamwork cooperation, customer relations, 
leadership/supervision, communication, and resource management (Pg 11).  In furtherance of 
those factors, discriminators were used to give a more in-depth description of what constituted 
each factor, while descriptors were used to measure the level of performance that was expected 
from an employee within each level, or pay band.  AcqDemo also implemented the concept of 
weighting the competencies, that is giving one more importance over another, and while they did 
institute a process, they also decided that all factors would be weighted evenly across all 
positions, that no one factor would be weighted less than half its original weight, and that all 
employees were to be advised of weights at the start of the evaluation period (Pg 11).  The 
concept of weighting can affect the perceived equity of the system, but here that is mitigated by 
the transparent nature of the evaluation process and the communication of the system’s central 
tenets.      
 While organizational wide competencies can be functional, the NRL project chose to 
utilize “critical elements,” specific competencies that were applied to each individual career path 
(Pg 11).  In addition, supervisors were given the ability to develop additional individual 
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performance standards as they felt were needed.  As in AcqDemo, descriptors and discriminators 
were utilized.  An example of the NRL project’s competency assessment based on a 
Science/Engineering Professional career path was explained.  Within that career path, the critical 
element is scientific and technical problem solving, while the discriminators are level of 
oversight needed, creativity, technical communication, and recognition. The descriptors included 
“recognized within own organization for technical ability” and “recognized internally and 
externally by peers for technical expertise,” both representing a different level of pay grades or 
bands.  Management used the critical elements, measured them by the discriminators, determined 
the level of performance within the employees pay level, assessed any additional performance 
measures placed on the employee by their supervisor, and arrived at a performance achievement 
measure (Pg 55).  While NRL did utilize weighting, the project decided that only the critical 
elements should be weighted, and that most often weighting was used for the 
scientific/engineering career path (Pg 11).  Here the use of critical elements specifically 
addresses the performance of each employee’s competency as applied to job performance.  The 
continued use of the defining tools, descriptors and discriminators, add even more specificity to 
the evaluation process, and provides the system with internal consistency.  
 Both the NIST and DOC projects decided to utilize the critical elements, yet they applied 
then differently then NRL.  Instead of basing the critical elements on career paths, the NIST and 
DOC tailored the elements to each occupational position.  The DOC determined that the 
diversity of their workforce, each position had varying degrees of responsibilities and duties, 
required a system that could differentiate between those factors (Pg 11-12).  The DOC’s plan 
utilized a minimum of two, and maximum of six, critical elements, along with major activities to 
perform the elements (Pg 12).  The supervisors would then weight the critical elements based on 
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time on task and importance.  The weighting was accomplished at the supervisory level, with no 
tracking at the organizational level.  The ultimate evaluation was done using a Benchmark 
Performance Standards.  The standards ranged from the highest standard, “objectives were 
achieved with maximum impact, through exemplary work that demonstrated exceptional 
originality, versatility, and creativity,” to the lowest, “objectives and activities were not 
successfully completed, because failures in quality, quantity, completeness, and timelines of 
work (Pg 12).  The China Lake project also used competencies tailored to individual 
responsibilities.  In that project, the general rule that all criteria must be consistent with the 
employee’s work unit goals and objectives was central (Pg 12).  Additionally, the competency 
objectives could be set in two ways; the Task Approach, which measures the employee’s output, 
and the Functional Approach, which determines employee’s required skills and how well they 
are to be performed (Pg 12).  The employees and supervisors then choose from a prescribed set 
of skills including planning, analysis, coordination, and reporting/documentation.  In the end, 
employee performance was measured based on those agreed upon factors.  In utilizing the 
concept of critical elements in the evaluation process, these three projects found that it was more 
simplistic and an easily administered process.  Though each used some variations in conjunction 
with critical elements, all grounded their system in the concept of differential measures for 
diverse employee responsibilities.  
 In translating performance ratings into actual pay increases, the GAO provided that a 
typical high performing organization seeks to achieve three objectives through the use of 
performance management; provide candid and constructive feedback to individual employees 
and maximize their potential in realizing the goals and objectives of the agency, provide 
management with the objectives and fact-based information it needs to reward top performers, 
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and provide the necessary information and documentation to deal with poor performers (Pg 12-
13). With that in mind, The China Lake Project used a predetermined range of pay increases to 
reward employee performance (Pg 13).  The supervisors utilized a numerical rating system, 
based on three assessment categories predicated on the employee’s performance, which 
translated into “increments.”  These individual increments corresponded to a permanent pay 
increase of approximately 1.5 percent of the employee’s base salary.  The numerical rating ran 
from a 1, highly successful to a 5, less than fully successful.  Increments were rewarded 
beginning at a 3 rating and continuing to a 5.  The results of this measure were that 11.3 % of 
employees received a 1 rating, 44.6% received a 2 rating, 44.0% received a 3 rating, while only 
0.2% received 4 and 5 ratings (Pg 14-16).  The average permanent pay increase was 3.5%.  In a 
similar system, NAVSEA used a performance system in which an employee’s performance 
rating was tied directly to predetermined permanent pay increases, one time rewards, or a 
combination of both.   
 The system used three steps to translate ratings into pay increases.  Initially, the 
supervisor rated the employee’s performance as either acceptable or unacceptable.  Those rated 
as unacceptable would get no further consideration (Pg 17-18).  Upon rating an employee 
acceptable, the supervisor would then rate the employee as a contributor, major contributor, or 
exceptional contributor, and recommend a number of pay points (Pg 19).  Pay points are a 
numerical rating from 0-4, which are dependent on the employee’s rating and current salary, and 
equaled approximately 1.5% of the midpoint salary within a pay band. Pay points could then be 
translated into permanent pay or one time rewards beginning with 0-2 points for a contributor, 1-
3 points for a major contributor, and 2-4 points for an exceptional contributor (Pg 17).  NAVSEA 
used some subjectivity in deciding who would receive permanent increases or awards, but most 
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often those who were deemed top performers were awarded with permanent increases, with the 
caveat that those employees whose salaries were below the midpoint of their current pay band 
where given permanent increases as well (Pg 17).  The one-time awards were reserved for those 
employees whose contributions were equaled to their base salaries. The results showed that 
39.6% of employees were rated as exceptional contributors, 40.3% were rated as major 
contributors, and 20% were rated as contributors.  No employee was rated as unacceptable (Pg 
18). The average permanent increase was 1.3% and the average one time award was $1100.00 
(Pg 18).   
 The use of these evaluation and rewards schemes show the diversity that can be 
incorporated into performance-based pay systems.  While both of the projects concentrated on 
managing employee movement and incentive payment amounts, they also utilized the band 
system to facilitate their individual merit systems.   An interesting point lies in the evaluation 
outcomes of both schemes. The NAVSEA project had no employees rated unacceptable and 
China Lake had a miniscule percentage.  While it is possible that all employees performed at 
acceptable levels, there could be some intervening issue that caused these outcomes.   
 In using a different system to tie performance ratings to actual pay, the DOC project 
delegated ratings evaluation, and their translation to pay, to individual pay pools.  These pay 
pools were inter-agency organizations that determined the amount of money that was to be paid 
for performance within a group or the entire organization.  In this system, the supervisors 
evaluated employees on a range of performance elements from 0-100.  Employees with less than 
40 were deemed unsatisfactory were not eligible to receive any form of permanent pay increase, 
reward, or locality pay.  Those employees rated above 40 were eligible for general pay increases 
and locality adjustments, and were also eligible, at the discretion of the pay pool managers, for 
       52
performance based pay increases and rewards.  The pool managers then made decisions on 
performance increases based on an employee’s performance score and current salary.  
Employees with lower salaries within their respective pay bands were eligible for higher 
increases and usually were awarded permanent pay increases, while those who were at the top of 
their pay bands were awarded one time rewards.  In this evaluation and reward scheme, the 
concept of incentive pay in proportion to base salary is exemplified.  As stated earlier, for a 
reward to be meaningful, it must be perceived as so.  The use of proportional incentives 
addresses that issue. The results showed that 41.7% of employees were rated 90-100, 45.1% 
were rated 80-89, and 11% were rated 70-79.  Of the remaining employees, 1.7% rated 60-69, 
.2% rated 50-59, 03% rated 40-49.  No employee was rated unsatisfactory.  Here again managing 
the amount of employee payments is a central motivation, yet the additional use of pay pools and 
proportional incentives incorporate a diverse array of management tools to that end. 
 The GAO then pointed to the issue of managing an employee’s movement through the 
pay bands as an important factor in maintaining a performance management system.  This 
concern is grounded in the possibility that, if unregulated, employee’s may very quickly progress 
through pay bands, and the organizations would be unable to absorb the resulting costs.  The 
NIST project managed movement through pay bands by awarding higher pay increases to 
employees who are at the bottom of the pay band, and gradually tapering off the amounts of 
permanent increases as the employee progressed within the band (Pg 29).  Within each pay band, 
five intervals determined the maximum percentage that could be received from permanent pay 
increases at any one time (Pg 30).  Similarly, China Lake and NAVSEA utilized checkpoints, or 
“speed bumps,” within their pay bands (Pg 30).  These measures were used to manage the cost of 
salary increases, while ensuring that that the performance system accurately portrayed salaries as 
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employees moved through the pay bands.  An example provided at China Lake was that when an 
employee advances to the midpoint of his or her pay band, any further permanent pay increase 
must be accompanied by a rating of highly successful and be authorized by a senior management 
review board (Pg 30).  A kin to managing employee movement and pay is the idea of utilizing 
one-time rewards in the place of permanent increases.  It is intuitive that a one-time reward will 
be less costly in the long run than a permanent increase, and the NAVSEA project incorporated 
that concept when it utilized a system that paid one-time awards as employee’s progressed higher 
within their bands (Pg 31).  Additionally, the China Lake project allowed pay pools to transfer 
budgets for awards to those for permanent increases (Pg 31).  The concepts utilized by these 
projects to control employee promotions, incentive payments, and increases are necessary to 
manage pay banded systems, yet these same management tools can also have negative effects on 
the ability of employees to progress, at acceptable intervals, in the event of funding problems, or 
as discussed earlier, the bastardization of the system.  
 In examining the research, there was an inherent delineation between public and private 
organizations and their approaches to, and motivations for, performance-based pay schemes. In 
the private sector merit pay is ingrained in the capitalist philosophy where monetary incentives 
drive production, while the public sector is motivated by a different set of incentives that are 
related to serving the public and feeling involved in the process.   
 The research initially focused on the reasons for the advent of merit pay systems in the 
public sector.  The idea that government must change to meet the changing environment, and 
current societal problems, was espoused in a great deal of the literature.  The entrepreneurial 
spirit that is central to the private sector, that belief that incentives drive production, was touted 
as a solution to lagging performance in public organizations.   
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 The concept of organizational culture was examined throughout the literature as well.  
Academic and government sponsored studies espoused the need for any performance-based pay 
system to fit the core beliefs of the organization.  Also mentioned, was the understanding that the 
stakeholders must ‘buy in’ to the system for it to be effective.  These two ideas are conjoined.  
For the effective implementation of merit pay into an organization, there must be compatibility 
with the core beliefs and goals of the organization, and the system must also be acceptable to the 
managers and employees.   
 The team concept and its relation to performance-based pay yielded some interesting 
information.  Much of the literature touted the use of teams as a more efficient way to achieve 
diverse goals, and included the idea that a team must be evaluated as such.  Explaining that, 
attempts to measure team performance, based on individual performance, had the inherent 
problem of incongruent goals.  In the end, the literature on the subject espoused the use of both 
team and individual incentive schemes, reasoning that teamwork can be measured by outcome, 
and individual rewards can be given in relation to that success based on seniority, 
responsibilities, or other factors.  The concept of peer pressure, as it relates to the free rider 
problem, was explored as well.  The literature made the point that in the team environment, the 
pressure exerted on members by the team to conform has a highly motivating effect. 
 The concept of funding, a major problem in the implementation of merit pay systems in 
the public sector, was explored in the literature.  This problem is central to government’s 
implementation of performance-based pay.  Remarkably, the government will expend large 
amounts of capital in the planning and implementation phases of new systems, but fail to 
continue funding the systems once they are initiated.  This is due to funding being under the 
jurisdiction of Congress, while the implementation and planning are controlled by the individual 
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organizations.   In all the literature, the problem was addressed, with the consensus being that for 
a system to be effective funding was a necessity. That is, funding the incentive payments in an 
incentive pay plan is essential to the legitimacy and continuation of the system.   
 Pay banding, as a system, was introduced in the literature.  Pay banding, as theorized, 
would give the public sector the ability to respond to changes in demands for certain skill groups, 
which in turn, would allow for higher pay for certain workers, and the ability of high performing 
workers to continue earning increased salaries.  The system is espoused as a replacement for the 
General Schedule, used by the federal government.  The literature, without exception, was 
positive concerning the pay banding systems, yet the literature was also skewed.  Since pay 
banding is fundamentally a replacement for the General Schedule, a government system, and 
most, if not all, of the literature on the subject was provided by government entities or studies by 
groups on behalf of government organizations, the information must be examined in that context.   
Methodology   
 In the process of this study, I reviewed the organizational documents of public sector 
institutions and interviewed their human resource managers and employees in an attempt to 
determine the functionality of their particular performance-based pay systems. The study is 
drawn from performance-based pay systems currently in use in the public sector and is 
qualitative in nature.   
 The study focused on four organizations, three in the federal government and one within 
county government.  I examined and analyzed public documents, including the Federal Register 
and available organizational plans, which describe the pay for performance systems of each 
organization.  Additionally, I was granted permission, and interviewed a human resource 
manager from two of the organizations and one employee from each organization.  I questioned 
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the managers to clarify any confusing points found in the system and collected their opinions on 
the functionality of their particular system.  Once the managers had been interviewed, I spoke 
with an employee currently working under each system.  During that interview, I collected 
information on the employee’s opinions of the functionality of the system and how it was 
working for the organization and indivdual employees.  
 The cases were chosen on the basis of the organizational type and the availability of 
information.  The federal organizations were selected due to their number of employees, their 
organizational responsibilities, and their use of performance pay, while the county organization 
was selected due to its progressive management plan in incorporating performance-based pay.   
 The managers were chosen because they were the human resource representative for the 
organization.  The purpose of the study was explained to them, along with the reasons that their 
organization had been selected.  The managers then agreed to participate in the study.   
  The employees were chosen from a list provided by the managers.  After contacting 
several of the employees, the employee who was selected for the interview had been employed in 
the system for at least two years and had an interest in assisting in the study.     
 The confidentiality of one of the federal organizations and the county organization, 
including the individuals that granted interviews, has been ensured.  At no point in the study did 
I refer to any of those organizations, human resource managers, or employees by name.  In 
referencing the organizations and individuals I utilized an alphanumeric system.  Example, a HR 
manager in Public Organization 1 is refered to as SPUBORG1, and an employee in Public 
Organization 2 is refered to as WPUBORG2.  The only organizations that I did refer to by name 
are the Department of Defense, and being that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
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its performance-based pay scheme, Max HR, are the subject of the study, I referenced both of 
those specifically.   
 The information I  provided on the Department of Defense came from publised 
government documents.  Most of the information I presented in reference to the Department of 
Homeland Security and Max HR came from my personal knowledge or from published 
information.  In addition I interviewed a manager from DHS in order to gain the perspective of 
someone who had been trained in, and was operating under, the Max HR system.  The manager’s 
confidentiality has been protected as stated above, referenced only alphanumerically.   
 I examined the documents first.  The documents were analyzed from the reference of 
each organization’s performance-based pay system.  I examined the general tenets of each 
system, the implementation process, the evalauation system, each system’s use of pay bands, 
rewards, teams, and finally the issue of funding.  I  then searched for patterns that indicated the 
success or failure of performance-based systems functioning within those organizations.  
 I then examined the interview data.  The interview data were collected using open ended 
questions to elicit subjects’ opinions on and attitudes toward their current performance-based pay 
system. The interviews were conducted in person or on the telephone, depending on the location 
of the subject.  Some individuals were in other states. The data were analyzed by categorizing the 
subjects’ opinions and attitudes based on four general concepts: the equity of the performance 
pay system, the success of the organization at implementing the system, the function of the 
system, and any other issues they felt were important.  
 The information learned from the analysis of the interview data, coupled with the  
patterns from the document analysis and input from the DHS manager was then used to assess 
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the impending implementation of  Max HR and the possible affects on the DHS and its 
employees.  
Study Limitations  
 As this study begins and continues, it will become clear that the only information on the 
private sector was provided earlier in the research. Here I feel I must qualify the reasons for my 
ultimate decision to exclude the private sector.  As I began my study, I attempted to gain the 
involvement of private businesses to show real world examples and collect valuable information 
on the diversity of performance-based pay schemes currently in use in that sector.  However, 
though my attempts were assiduous, I was unable to find one company that would allow me to 
examine their current merit pay plan, or discuss it for that matter.  Initially, I felt that my 
approach was lacking and changed it several times.  First, using a “lead in” from the university, 
then keeping the fact that the study was for academic reasons masked, and finally by using the 
connections network to gain contact with management.  In the end, none of my approaches were 
successful, and although a friend did get me an interview with a general manager for a large 
corporation, once I mentioned a study of his merit pay systems, he uttered the same word 
espoused by all who wish to keep their information private.  He stated that the information was 
proprietory.  On every occasion, without exception, no private company would give me the data 
needed for the study.  In the end, I acquired an impressive document, on university letterhead, 
asking for cooperation for the purpose of an academic study. Though I sent many of the letters 
out, not one was returned.  After three weeks, it became clear that the private sector was not 
interested in my study, and I was forced to abandon my attempts. 
 I feel it is also important to discuss the fact that I attempted to include some data from the 
third sector, non- profit organizations.  The information discovered in relation to non-profits and 
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performance-based pay was theoritical in nature.  In all the literature I examined, and in 
discussions with individuals involved in that sector, I discovered a good amount of theory as to 
how a system would operate, but found no functional systems that were able to provide sufficient 
data for the purposes of this study.  In the future, I am sure the sector will begin to implement 
merit pay, but presently more study and examination is needed. 
 As a result of the small sample used in this study, its extrapolation to the other elements 
of performance-based pay not covered here is limited.  While the study does yield compelling 
issues to be considered in the discussion of meirt pay, it is not comprehensive enough to be 
considered conclusive. 
 My next attempt at collecting organizational data was enlightening.  I will use the name 
of the organization due to the fact that the only information I was able to obtain was through 
literature that was published on the Internet.  The Department of Defense has 300,000 civilian 
employees, and all are currently being converted to a new merit based pay system.  In many 
attempts, both by telephone and E-mails, I was unable to reach a representative that would speak 
with me on this subject.  While it is true that the system, dubbed the National Security Personnel 
System, has been embroiled in a number of court challenges, I felt that the organization would be 
willing to contribute to a study of performance-based pay within the government, but I was 
mistaken.  On one occasion, a contact person, a relatively high ranking individual in human 
resources for the deparment, stated that it would be difficult to gain the information because the 
department was not forthcomming with any particulars at the time.   
 I then acquired government documents, via the internet, that explain the general tenets of 
the Department of Defense’s new pay program and how it is intended to function.  In this, I 
intend to document the main concepts of the system due to its significance in the present 
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discussion on performance-based pay.  While I will have no input from human resource mangers 
or employees, I believe that the DOD and DHS systems include the same general concepts, and 
feel the inclusion of this system is important to the outcome of my study.   
Results 
 The initial Department of Defense document I examined, the National Security Personnel 
System (NSPS) Proposed Regulations, stated the reasons for the proposed, impending, change.  
The DOD stated that the current, General Schedule, is inadequate to manage the civilian 
workforce in todays environment, stating that the hiring system is too slow, which inhibits the 
organizations ability to attract and retain quality employees.  Additionally, the DOD expalined 
that the current pay system fails to compensate outstanding performers over poor performers, and 
that the rigid, highly structred, current system hinders the DOD’s ability to manage its employees 
(Pg 3).  Here we find some of the same reasons for change as forwarded in the literature.   
 The DOD points to the changing environment and the need to attract and retain high 
performers.  Inherent in those issues are the ideas of better effeciency by hiring and retaining 
better personnel and enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization.  The DOD 
then stated the general tenets of the NSPS: Produce a high performing workforce and 
management, where employees and supervisors will be compensated and retained based on their 
performance; create an agile and responsive workforce, a workforce that can be easily sized, 
shaped, and deployed to meet mission requirements; ensure a credible and trusted system, a 
system which assures openness, clarity, accountability and adherence to the public employment 
principles of merit and fitness, and formulate a fisically sound system, a system in which 
aggregate increases in civilian payroll, at the appropriations level, will conform to fisical 
guidence, with a supportive infrastructure system, in which information technology support and 
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training will be available and funded(Reqirements Pg 7).  In these principles are the foundation 
for the system, and many allude to concepts already discussed.  The NSPS will ensure that the 
system is clear and open, insuring that all employees understand the evaluation and rewards 
process, and are aware of all the important issues.  This is good practice and will facilitate trust 
and validity in the system. The system also will ensure funding is available at the time of the 
appropriation, and will ensure training and technical support are available and properly funded.  
This statement is problamatic in that the appropriations for the system will be decided by 
Congress and not the DOD.  As a result of instituting the new system, the DOD expects to have 
high performing employees, who are motivated.  The DOD also expects that it will gain the 
ability to react to mission critical issues in a more timely manner.  While these expectations my 
be realized, it follows the ideas of a utopia, as alluded too in the literature, which is unrealistic.  
The system will initially experience difficulty, as all new merit systems will, and after needed 
modifications there is the possibility that the DOD could realize the positive effects it seeks.      
 As pointed to in the NSPS proposed regulations, an initial concern for the DOD in the 
implementation of the system was if the organizational culture, that of the civilian employee’s, 
was prepared for the change (Pg 3).  To that end, the DOD found that the employees had a strong 
sense of mission, understood how their work contributed to that mission (Pg 3), and with that, 
decided that the organizational culture was ready for the implementation of the merit based pay 
system.  The document also pointed to experimental projects, and work studies, initiated by the 
General Accounting Office and the Office of Personnel Management, and engaged by the 
Department of Defense.  The DOD stated that the success of those experiments led to the current 
implementation of the NSPS (Pg 2).  The document then stated that the senior leadership of the 
organization, including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, was supporting the new system 
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and that he had approved the NSPS regulations (Pg  2).  Here again the principles found in the 
literature surface.  The DOD understands that the system must fit the organizational culture and 
that support from senior management is also a determining factor of ultimate success.   
 In the NSPS Proposed Regulations , the DOD states that the system will operate utilizing 
pay bands.  The system will group positions in broad career groups and will incorporate pay 
schedules that are based on the nature of the work, the mission, career patterns and competencies 
(Pg 7).  Additionally, the General Schedule’s pay grades will be expanded to include larger 
salary ranges based on level of experience and time on the job, ranging from entry level, to full 
performance, and ultimately, senior expert (pg 7).  The DOD reasons that use of the band system 
will allow for more flexability in assigning employees, the elimination of the need for specific, 
detailed, job descriptions, and that movement through the bands will be based primarily on 
performance and contribution. (Pg 7).  Here the DOD, a government agency, follows the 
literature information verbatim. The positive outcomes expected from the pay band system are 
listed, the system is touted to result in those outcomes, but in the end there is no conclusive 
evidence that the results will be realized.  As with all systems, the results will become evident as 
implementation and administration continue over time. 
 The NSPS system also includes an evaluation management element.  The cornerstone of 
the element is the evaluation system.  This measurement system is centered on first line 
supervisors working with employees to establish performance goals and expectations, all aligned 
with the department’s mission.  In addition, there will be a conduct recognition measure 
(Regulations Pg 7).  That is, the system will incorperate a measure of the employee’s behavior 
and professional demeanor, and that will be included as part of the employee’s performance 
rating.  Additionally, the element will involve intensive training for managers and employees, 
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ongoing communication and feedback between managers and employees, and will result in 
ultimate performance ratings reflecting meaningful distinctions in employee performance  
(Regulations Pg 7).  This performance element of the NSPS again contains the imperative 
concepts listed in the literature.  It first mentions the role of the first line supervisors in driving 
the system.  While the inherent problems with human relationships in management, the inability 
or unwillingness of managers to properly implement negative aspects of management systems, 
have been explored in the literature, the NSPS ignores the problem and states that the supervisors 
will be trained intensively and will have communication and feedback, bottom up and top down, 
with employees.  Once again a utopian view of the system.  The human factor, as related to in the 
literature, is ubiquitous.  While training can mitigate the problem to an extent, the use of 
communication and feedback will only be functional if, and only if, all involved are willing 
participants, the system proves to be legitimate, and the supervisors are engaged in positive, and 
more importantly, negative feedback, with their subordinates.  Additionally, the inclusion of a 
conduct measure seems a bit abstract.  With the discussion of subjectivity in performance 
measures, unless the measure is concrete, for example number of adverse actions or written 
reprimands, this measurement will be difficult to qualify and as a result could negaively impact 
the entire system. 
 The NSPS also contains elements of pay and compensation, which in turn effects the 
hiring and staffing of the organization.  In relation to pay, the system will allow the DOD to 
move towards market sensative pay, considering local demand for certain skill sets, and will 
facilitate greater flexability in setting employee salaries (Regulation Pg 7).  Additionally, the 
increase in an employee’s pay will be based on performance and contribution, rather than 
longivity (Regulation Pg 7).  The point being that the larger pay increases would go to the higher 
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performers,  with no increases for unacceptable performers.  The effect on staffing will be a 
streamlined hiring process due to the flexabiliy in salary assignment, the ability of the DOD, in 
conjunction with the Office of Personnel Management, to establish new hiring authority, tailored 
to the needs of the organization, and the ability to have direct hire authority for critical needs 
(Regulation Pg 7).  These ideas exemplify the concepts that are realisic in performance-based 
pay, and in the NSPS particularly.  The implemntation of merit pay will allow more freedom in 
hiring, for it allows the organization the ability to make decisions previously controlled by the 
regulations of the General Schedule.  The ability to make salary assignments, ensure that your 
organization is competitive in recruiting, and award your high performers, are all important 
attributes in peformance-based pay.  Additionally, the concept of paying for performance versus 
longivity is important in that it inables the organizaion to grow with the highest quality human 
resources.  This, in turn, makes recruiting, hiring, and the system in general, much easier to 
manage.  
 The continued implementation fo the NSPS has additional, paramount consideraion. The 
problems of funding, discussed briefly in the discussion of the system, but more in depth in the 
literature, is a great concern for the DOD.  While the DOD proposes that the additional costs of 
the current implementation process will be funded through training and current budget systems 
(Requirements Pg 14), the future of program funding is not as clear.  In fact, with an 
understanding of the importance that funding has on the ultimate success of the NSPS, the DOD 
refers to the possibility of drawing funds from programs that may, or may not, be funded in the 
future.  The Human Capital Performance Fund, a 500 million dollar fund to facilitate 
performance-based pay in the government, which was proposed by the current Bush 
Administration and was examined in the literature, has never been activated or funded, and is 
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one such resource refered to by the DOD as a source to offset the continued cost of the system 
(Requirement Pg 14).   
 In addition to the points already examined, and in regards to my study, the DOD 
considers intraction with DHS, due to the common features of their appeals and labor systems, to 
be important.  The DOD believes that a collabrative relationship between the two organizations 
will benefit both (Requirements Pg 16).  This idea of this relationship is interesting, but not 
surprizing.  Both agencies are in the process of implementation, both are being challenged in 
litigation and suffering defeats, and both are attempting to change the entrenched General 
Schedule.  In addition, both organizations have large numbers of employees with a diverse array 
of job titles.  While these issues are factual, the problem with a unified front, from the 
perspective of the employees, is that the two organizations have a geat deal of power.  In the 
event that both systems are fully implemented, employee perception of implementation equity 
may be negative.   
 This examination of the National Security Personnel System has illuminated the general 
tenets, the operating guidelines, and the elements involved in the system.  While it falls short of 
examining the system in action, it is important to undertand the system, how it is being 
implemented and how it will be managed.  The DOD, like DHS, is currently involved in 
implementing performance-based pay concepts into the federal govrnment.  Concepts that are 
foreign to the culture and are being met with great resistance.  The inclusion of this informaion is  
valuable to this study. 
 The next organization, which will be refered to as PUBORG1, involves a federal 
organization that has been in existance for four decades.  It is a large organization involved in 
transportation, and has employees throughout the United States and abroad.  PUBORG1 first 
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began to implement performance-based pay in the 1990’s, and today has a meirt based 
compensation system firmly in place.  Like other government organizations, PUBORG1 has 
diversity in its workforce and incapsulates a wide array of job classifications.  The organization’s 
current performance pay has the ability to relate to that diversity, while still being functional and 
reactive.   
 In the conception phases of the system, PUBORG1 considered the new system a strategic 
management tool, which would change the organizational paradigm, and assist the organizaion, 
both employees and managers, in changing the way business had been done.  I addition, the 
system would allow the organization to be more productive and able to acknowledge the value of 
individual contribution, acountability, and organizational success (ORG1 Pg1).  PUBORG1 
spents an inordinate amount of time in the planning phases to ensure that the new system would 
be fair to all sectors of the organization.  In being one of the first organizations to implement a 
performance-based pay system, they believed that any failure to implement a successful system 
would be deterimental to the organization and the concept of meirt based pay (ORG1 Pg 18).  To 
that end, the organization used a series of study groups and committees, comprised of 
management, senior executives, and employees to arrive at a workable system that would be 
accepted by the organizaion, both by the people and organizational culture (ORG1 Pg 9). 
PUBORG1 also used the committee concept to arrive at the objectives for the implementation of 
the system and, the central tenets contained in the system.  The objectives; included, among 
others, the organization’s need to recognize value, the ability to place value on the work of 
employees, the need to compensate wokers based on their performance, and the need for 
increasing productivity were all seen as the motivation for the change.  These objectives are 
important in that they set the ground work for the implementation of the system, and provide a 
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schematic for its use.  While the objectives set the system for implementation, the general tenets 
of the system actually actuate its functionality.  PUBORG1 set as the first tenet, ensuring 
fairness.  This tenet is important in that it reflects a number of the core elements to a sucessful 
performance pay system.  In discussing fairness, the organization states that treating people fairly 
is the cornerstone to the system’s success (ORG1 Pg 10), and continues by forwarding the idea 
that the new compensation program ensures that all employees are treated fairly through 
appropriate practices, guidelines, and policies (ORG1 Pg 10).  In this tenet we find a number of 
ideas communicated in the literature.  The concept of equity, both preceieved and actual, have a 
great effect on meirt pay systems.  The organization realizes that fact, and at the onset of the 
system, acknowledges it publically.  Additionally, the inclusion of the statement that fairness will 
be reflected in the written policies that govern the system add to its legitimacy.  The second 
tenet, reflecting our culture and values, incompasses  more of the ideas presented in the 
literature.  PUBORG1 states, in relation to organizational culture and value, that meeting the 
needs of their dynamic environment means insuring that their fundamental culture, value, and 
respect for diversity remains constant, even as the system evolves (ORG1 Pg 11).  Here the 
organization openly expresses that the fundamental culture of the organization, the way the 
organization and its employees view themselves, will not change.  Incumbent in that statement is 
the understanding that the new system will bring changes, changes that may not all be popular, 
but changes whose objective is not to fundamentally change the culture, but the way the culture 
addresses the organizaional mission.  The third tenet, ensuring fiscal responsibility, once again 
illuminates one of the most important facets found in the literature and the final factor of the 
system’s ultimate success.  The organization states that as a business, it is important to invest in 
new technologies and in their employees.  They continue by espousing the importance of 
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meeting their fiscal responsibilties, both to the employees and the organizaional mission (ORG1 
Pg 11).  Here the importance of fiscal responsibility is expessed as a general tenet.  Normally, the 
idea is inherent in the concept of implementing a new system, that is, the organizations do not 
include a statement that they will be financially responsible when initiaing a new program, it is 
understood, but here PUBORG1 finds it necessary to do so.  As discussed in the literature,  
funding can be a large impasse in the management and ultimate success of a merit pay plan, it 
seems that the organization has addressed that problem, if only as a general concept of the plan.  
 PUBORG1’s performance-based plan is results oriented, that is, all pay increases 
are linked to individual performance and development, including employee contributions, or 
outputs, and organizational success (ORG1 Pg17).  The plan ties success on the individual level 
with the overall success of the organization, in fact, there are two components to the plan, within 
each, there is the possibility of performance awards for the indivdual employee.  The system is 
driven by the first line supervisors.  The employees meet with their supervisors, the 
measurements and objectives are discussed, and the evaluation is completed, yearly, by the 
supervisor determining if the agreed upon goals and objectives were met.  The system is 
dependent on the decisions of the first line supervirsors in both of the follwing components.  The 
first component, Organizational Success Increase, is an annual increase, to base salary, that will 
be awarded to most employees provided PUBORG1 meets its performance goals and the 
employee maintains an acceptable performance level.  The second component, Superior 
Contribution Increase, provides an additional increase for those employees who make sigificant 
contributions to the organization as determined by a structured process, insuring fairness.  The 
increase is awarded to the top 15% of performers based on performance and contribution as 
determined by management (ORG2 Pg 6).  The use of this results driven plan exemplifies the 
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concepts of measuring employee outputs, utilizing the concepts of teams, and insuring the 
evaluation process is transparent.  In relation to employee outputs, as put forth in the literature, it 
is important, and easier, to award for performance based on a specific employee contribution, 
measured at the most basic level.  Using a structure, a system, to determine acceptable outputs, 
and awarding the employees for those outputs, ensures both the perception and actualization of 
equity.  In addition, although not specifically addressed as such, the concept of teams and team 
work is alluded to in the Organizational Success Component.  Here the ideas that the overall 
success of the group, in this case organization, is important as evidenced by the inclusion of the 
reward.  For the organization to succeed, the members must perform well, insuring their 
individual outputs add to the increased effectiveness of the organization.  Following the best 
practice explored in the literature of evaluating the team as a team, PUBORG1’s evaluation of 
the individual employee’s contribution is amalgamated into a single measure based on team, or 
organizational, success.                       
 Finally, the issue of perscribing a percentage of the number of employees who will be 
awarded can result in problems.  A merit pay system is limited by financial concern and funding 
will always be a concern, that is understood, but there is also an inherent problem with limiting 
the number of employees who can be labeled as high performers.  For instance, in the event an 
organization has 25% of the workforce rated as high performers, how are the decisions on 
exclusions based?  The problem may never come to fruition, but in its eventualization there are 
two considerations;  Will the exclusion be based on a clearly communicated basis, and if not, 
will that negatively effect the system’s integrity?   
 The plan also incorporates the use of pay banding.  In PUBORG1’s plan the pay band 
system envolves the use of 12 bands, replacing the General Schedules 15 grade system.  Each of 
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the bands has a salary range of $9000.00, within entry level to $43000.00, in the highest level 
(ORG2 Pg 5).  An employee’s entry into their particular band is based on their job classification 
and experience, and their progression from band to band is based on promotional considerations, 
which include performance, testing, and available vacancies (ORG1 Pg 25).  The pay band 
system eliminates the need for grade increases and quality grade step increases, and instead 
utilizes the previously examined concepts of  performance linked to both organizational success 
and individual competence.  While the use of the pay band system here, and as examined in the 
literature, will allow flexabilty in hiring and retention of top performers, there remains the 
possibility that high performing employees may be unable to earn any increases.  For example, 
the banding has a 15% cap for awards, it is possible for the same individual to be eliminated 
from consideration year after year.  Additionally, in the event the system is unfunded, there will 
be no money for any percentage of top performers, and with no automatic step increaes, the 
employees can only hope for yearly increases from the executive branch, usually 2-3%. 
 PUBORG1’s system, in relation to types of rewards, utilizes both base salary increases 
and one time rewards.  The one time rewards are given for isolated performance in certain 
situations, or in replacement of base salary increases (ORG1 Pg 34).  As in the literature, 
PUBORG1 uses one time payments as a cost managing measure.  Intuitively, it is less expensive 
to give a one time award, then to give a base salary increase that will be realized for years to 
come.  In this, the use of one time awards can be used to substituted for salary increases when 
needed.  The system does not mention non-monetary rewards, or intrinsic rewards, specifically, 
it instead foucuses on the use of monetary compensation.  While it could be argued, and has in 
the literature, that intrinsic rewards have a more far reaching effect on performance, the concepts 
       71
of intrinsic rewards in PUBORG1 are found in the conception of its plan, and the organizational 
culture it perpetuates. 
 In the conception, planning, and management of its system, PUBORG1 set funding as a 
high priority, making great efforts to ensure the system continues to be funded during and after 
implementaion.  The system uses a management committee that provides advice and counsel to 
the adminstration (ORG1 Pg 27).  The admistration, with the committee’s advice, ensures that 
the organization contiues to provide equiable compensation to all employees based on market 
demands, and is able to meet the continuing challenge of funding for awards payments in both 
the organizational and superior contributions programs (ORG1 Pg 28).  To that end, the 
administration, on a yearly basis, takes the available information and determines the annual pay 
increases of all employees based on the two awards programs.  The administration examines the 
percentage of employees expected to receive superior contribution incentives, usually calculated 
at 15%, and those expected to receive organizational contribution incentives, 85%, then adjusts 
the percentages based on the available budget.  There are two inherent problems with this type of 
financial management as it relates to the operation of a successful system.  While funding is 
always a problem, most government agencies need more money than they are allotted, in this 
instance, setting a percentage, as stated earlier, presents the inherent question of equity.  If the 
system is truly performance driven, what of those employees who perform, but are not 
compensated.  Additionally, if 85% of the workforce is being rewarded, the question of system 
validity is at issue.  While it is possible for 85% of workers to warrant awards, it is not probable 
on a continuing basis.  The funding issue is paramount to system sustainability, and PUBORG1 
addresses its importance.  The major problem is that the organization has no real control over the 
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issue, and although they understand its importance, in the end, they must compete with other 
organizations for the same funds.  
 In an interview with a supervisor for PUBORG1, who will be refered to as SPUBORG1, 
I clarified the information in the organization’s performance-based pay system and garnered 
information on its functionality from a management perspective. SPUBORG1 stated that in 
advance of the implementation for the merit pay system, the organization took great efforts in 
insuring the employees understood the reasoning and need for the change.  She stated that the 
organizational culture facilitated the employee’s understanding that a new system was needed 
and played a large role in the ultimate acceptance of the system (ORG3 Pg1).  SPUBORG1 also 
stated that the employees at first resisted the notion of change, but after the efforts of the 
organization in communicating the general tenets of the system, were in agreement with its 
implementation (ORG3 Pg 1).  When asked what percipitated the change to the new system, 
SPUBORG1 advised that the organization felt that the General Schedule had proven to be 
ineffective, and stated that she agreed, and that it had failed to do poor management.  She 
continued by stating that the use of a performance-based pay scheme was seen as a means to 
ensure the organization was able to meet the challenges of the future without the restrictions of 
the General Schedule (ORG3 Pg 1).  When asked if the implementation process was lacking in 
any way, SPUBORG1 stated that the implementation process needed more planning from the 
management side, advising that human resources, planning, and budgeting should have been 
intergrated to avoid turf wars (ORG3 Pg 1).  When asked her beliefs on the effectiveness of 
performance-based pay, SPUBORG1 advised that the system’s business model, in which the 
goals are competitive pay, increased productivity, and increased intellectual capital, is useful, but 
is not always able to be intergrated into the public sector (ORG3 Pg 1).  SPUBORG1 went on to 
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state that her organization did a good job at intergrating the business model, but the system 
continued to have problems although it had been in place for a decade (ORG3 Pg 1).  When 
asked to expound on the problems, she stated that funding was a big issue, along with the 
problem of limiting the amount of awards (ORG3 Pg 2).  SPUBORG1 explained that the 
organization is very large and that funds are limited.  She stated that the award amounts are 
small, and that they are insufficient motivation for employees.  Additionally, SPUBORG1 stated 
that the organization has not funded the awards portion of the performance-pay system for the 
past few years, which has resulted in no performance increases, but only yearly pay raises from 
the president, approximately 3% per year (ORG3 Pg 2).  I then asked about the use of paybands.  
SPUBORG1 advised that the pay band system worked to give flexability in hiring new workers.  
She stated that is was functional to that end, but also advised that the compensation ranges within 
the bands were not adjusted regularly, and that the promotion from one pay band to the next was 
limited by available vacancies, which had been scarce (ORG3 Pg 2).  When asked about the 
actual evaluation process, SPUBORG1 informed that the evaluation process was conducted on a 
quarterly bases, an adjustment from the program’s implementation, and she felt it was fair and 
equitable.  She stated that the employees are given their objectives by their managers, they 
converse concerning them, and there are four meetings throughout the year to confer on 
individual progress (ORG3 Pg 2).  When asked what she would change about the system, 
SPUBORG1 stated that the number of those employees who can be rated as top performers were 
limited by the organization, this led to the unpalatable situation of arbitrarily picking the 
employees to be awarded.  She stated that this had negative ramifications on employee morale 
and trust in the system (ORG3 Pg 2). Additionally, she stated that the lack of funding for the 
system undermined the idea of performance-based pay, and left the employees questioning the 
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system (ORG3 Pg2).  When asked if she felt the system was functional, SPUBORG1 stated that 
while certain facets of the system served a significant purpose, the funding issues overshadowed 
the effectivness of those elements.  She stated that the system, as proposed is a good concept, but 
that the problem is putting the concept into practice (ORG 3 Pg2). 
 In an interview with an employee of the organization, refered to as WPUBORG1, 
I attempted to ascertain his feelings on the implementation and management of the performance-
based pay systems.  I first asked if he felt the implementation of the new system was handled 
properly.  WPUBORG1 stated that he was hired following the attacks of September 11th, and that 
the organizational culture at the time was unclear.  He stated that the massive hiring of personnel 
following the attacks, and the attacks themselves, had in effect changed the culture.  He stated 
that the advent of the performance-based pay system seemed positive to all the new employees 
(ORG4 Pg 1).  I then asked if he felt the system was fair.  WPUBORG1 answered that he felt the 
system was fair to new hires, but that it became less fair as his career continued.  He qualified 
that by explaining that upon hire, an employee is placed in a pay band depending on job 
classification, training, and experience.  He continued by stating that after the initial hire, the 
employee is very quickly promoted through the bands to a predetermined point, similair to the 
General Schedule’s journeyman level, and in approximately two years the employee caps out.  
He stated that once the employee “caps out”, there are no guaranteed increases.  WPUBORG1 
stated the organization’s stand is that all raises above that point are budget driven, and he advised 
that the budget rarely allows for any increases (ORG4 Pg 1).  I then asked if he felt the rewards 
of the system provided proper motivation. He stated that the rewards were insufficient 
motivation due to the fact that they were rarely awarded, and when awarded, only a few 
individuals received then.   He added that the fact that a limited amount of employees received 
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awards caused him, and other employees, to question the equity of the system (ORG4 Pg 1).  I 
then asked if the pay band system worked as designed.  WPUBORG1 stated that upon hire, 
employee band placement is done on an arbritrary basis. For example, he advised that individuals 
he attended training with, who were hired a higher band levels, were obviously less qualified, or 
able, then he and others.  He stated throughout the organization he experienced the problem 
(ORG4 Pg 1).  I then asked if the evaluation process was fairly managed.  WPUBORG1 
explained that while the managers did evaluate in a fair manner, the basis of the evaluation was 
unclear.  He stated that in his evaluation conferences, little time was spent reviewing his 
performance, and more time was spent talking about other things.  He also stated that employees 
he had spoken with had experienced the same thing.  He ended by stating he felt management did 
not take the evaluation process serious since increases were not usually rewarded (ORG4 Pg 1).                     
 The queston of teamwork and intrinsic rewards was then broached.  When asked if the 
organization promoted team work, WPUBORG1 stated that he very often had to work in two 
person teams, but the organization never specifically rewarded those teams.  Additionally, when 
asked about intrinsic rewards, he stated that the organization promised a great deal in the way of 
job satisfaction, self management, and other rewards, but failed to deliver, causing many people 
to become disgruntled (ORG4 Pg 1). I then asked if the funding issue was a problem for morale.  
WPUBORG1 stated that the lack of funding effected the entire organization, management and 
employees, and ultimately made the performance pay system dysfuntional (ORG4 Pg 2).  In 
closing, I asked what he would change about the system.  WPUBORG1 stated that the funding 
issue was important, but that he would also change the probationary period so that the 
organization had more power to dismiss those who were unable to perform.  He stated that the 
current probationary period is nothing more than a longivity measure.  He also advised that 
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placing step increases within pay bands would be a good change.  To that end, he stated the 
General Schedule was still viable if managed properly (ORG4 Pg 2).   
 In my examination of PUBORG1, there was large differences between the system 
schematic and the actual operation.  The organization took a good approach at preparing the 
employees, at implementing a system that fit the culture, and at insuring important issues were 
addressed.  The problem of funding seems to be pervasive in every problem area , and the 
performance element with its lack of consequences is problamatic also.  While the SPUBORG1 
had positive comments on the evaluaton system and organization’s efforts during the planning 
and implementation phases, she agrees that the performance-based pay plan continues to have 
problems in the organization.  She also states that funding is a major concern, and that it is 
detrimental to the function of the system.  In examining the interview with WPUBORG1, it is 
clear that the system is not working from the employee’s perspective.  The most contentios issue 
being the lack of proper funding for the system. WPUBORG1 also states that the evaluation 
system is fair, but the evaluations mean nothing.  In addition, he stated that limiting award funds 
leads to limited persons receiving awards, which leads to questions of equity.  In examing this 
case for major themes, funding, or the lack of funding, in effect has diminished the good 
intentions and indepth planning of the organization, and has limited, if not eliminated, the 
performance incentive that the system was implmented to promote.     
 The second organization, PUBORG2 was studied to include a local agency, in this case a 
county level organization, into my study.  The organization is progressive as evidenced by its 
implementation of a comprehensive performance-based pay plan, and it was the only 
organization at the county level that I discovered using merit pay.  The organization is involved 
       77
in the criminal justice system, and it handles the adjudication of criminal offenders within a 
county.   
 In giving the reasons for the initiation of performance-based pay, PUBORG2 states that 
the change to performance based pay was predicated on the belief that salary structures based on 
automatic pay increases, regardless of employee performance, are detrimental to organizational 
morale.  They also state that the public has a right to demand accountability from public 
organizations, and that the organization’s old pay structure, based on longivity and standard 
adjustments, did not provide that responsibility (ORG5 Pg1).  Here the organization is stating the 
ideas in the literature on response government, or government that is reactive to the new 
challenges of the time.  It is important that the oganization realizes that change is needed for 
agency advancement, and it is clear the organization feels strongly about fulfilling the public 
trust. 
 The concepts of organization culture and equity as they relate to the implementation and 
acceptance of the new system are then explained by the organization.  While PUBORG2 does 
state that their was considerable resistance on behalf of employees at the onset of the change, in 
great part due to the change effecting compensation, they also explain that they worked 
diligently to develop a fair and understandable system.  They state that the ability to 
communicate the tenets of the system to the employees, including the ability to have the unions 
and employees, buy in, was paramount (ORG5 Pg1).  Additionally, PUBORG2 stated that 
change is never easy, but that the organizational culture, one of mutual trust and reliance, made 
the transition much easier and more expiditious (ORG5 Pg1).   
 In these statements, we again find ideas provided in the literature.  The new system was 
implemented once the organization, employees and managers, accepted it.  Additionally, in this 
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case, the unions had to be swayed as well.  Without an organizational culture that involved trust 
and intrinsic motivation, the system may have never been implemented.  Also, the organization 
realizes that equity plays a large part in the success of the new plan.  To that end, they took great 
strides to ensure the system is fair, and that the facts were communicated to, and understood by, 
the employees.  
 In relation to the guiding principles of the new system, PUBORG2 explained that it 
incorporated five basic ideas on which the performance system was based.  The first is that each 
years appraisal stands alone, that is the current year’s evaluation is in no way based on previous 
measurements (ORG5 Pg1).  This frees the employee from any lingering effects of pass 
shortfalls.  The second principle, no forced distribution, is important in that there is no limit on 
how many employees will be awarded increases (ORG5 Pg 1).  No forced distribution ensures all 
the employees have an equal chance at awards.  The third principle, the fact that caseload and 
positions are considered is important because the diversity of assignments within the 
organization can affect an individual workers output (ORG 5 Pg 1).  That is, factors that are out 
of the control of the individual worker may affect performance, and fairness dictates 
considerations be made.  The fourth principle, performance appraisal is a shared responsibility, is 
novel.  Here the organization states that while the evaluation process is management driven, the 
individual employee must complete self evaluations to be considered in the evaluation process 
(ORG5 Pg2).  This is a new concept, but I believe the literature would agree, a functional one.  
The use of self evaluation lends legitimacy to the system.  Additionally, it enhances the concepts 
of system equity, open communication, and overall system validity.  The last principle, related to 
the final overall rating as a composite of individual ratings and level of importance, states that 
certain skills are more or less important depending on the diversity of duties (ORG5 Pg 2).  As 
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such, the final evaluation weights certain measurements based on those differences in 
importance.  This is a bit convoluted, but the importance lies in the fact that the weighting is used 
to ensure equity, and that the exact system is cleary communicated to the employees.  In these 
guiding principles there are some obvious similarities with those in the literature.  The concepts 
of insuring equity in the system, the belief that issues outside the control of the employees must 
be allowed for, and the belief in a system free from ambiguity are all present.  Additionally, the 
concept of self evaluation inherently contains all the positive features examined in this study. 
 The performance-base pay system uses a type of pay banding system.  PUBORG2 uses a 
four tier system, from Teir I, entry level with little experience, to Teir IV, top tier with many 
years of experience. Entrance into a tier, or band, is predicated on the employee’s years of 
service and some factor of experience (ORG5 Pg 4),  that is, upon hire, with regards to 
experience, an employee could be placed in an higher band with budget considerations being the 
paramount determining factor.  Once an employee is hired and placed in a band, they must spend 
a requisite time within that band before they can be promoted (ORG5 Pg 4).  In this, there is a 
performance element in that you must perform to receive pay increases within the band, but there 
is also a longivity element, in that no matter your performance, you may not be promoted to the 
next band without requisite time spent in the present band.  This is a type of hybrid band system.  
The use of performance and longivity seem to be counteractive, but controlled movement of 
employees, as seen in the literature, is a impotant in the finacial management, and overall 
success, of a merit based pay system.  This type of band system was not explored in the 
literature.  In fact, the systems in this study, and the literature, focussed on the elimination of 
longivity as a measure of competency, and touted its replacement with pure performance 
measures. 
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 The evaluation element of the system incorporates a rating matrix in which five levels are 
defined.  PUBORG2’s system ranges from Greatly Exceeds Standards, at the high end, to Does 
Not Meet Standards, at the low end (ORG5 Pg 2).  The employees are evaluated on three distinct 
types of skills; fundamental skills, those that all employees should possess to complete the work 
type, developmental skills, those skills that are expected to improve with experience and 
responsibility, and Personal/Motivational factors, or those factors that are determined by the 
employees interest in the work, initiative and creativity, and willingness to take on responsibility 
(ORG5 Pg 4).  These three concepts, easily understandable, are the basis for the evaluation 
process.  The final evaluation is based on a number system, derived from the measures of the two 
skill sets, with additional narative support from the motivational section.  Additionally, there is 
consideration of the self evaluation, and the assignment of the appropriate weight to each 
measure (ORG5 Pg 4).  In the end, the employee is rated on a number system from 1-5, anyone 
employee scoring under a “3” rating is not elligible for an increase.  The results are then given to 
the top supervisor and his assitance to ensure uniformity in the evaluation from manager to 
manager.   This evaluation process takes into account some very important tenets expressed in 
the literature.  First, the process is easy to understand and is managed with transparency in mind, 
secondly, it incorporates the concept of clear measures, and finally it ensures that the system is 
equiable from manager to manager, insuring system legitimacy. 
 In relation to rewards, PUBORG2 states that the usual increase as a result of performance 
is predicated on an amount of funding agreed upon yearly in collective bargining, and that 
employees are awarded a precentage of the midpoint of the salary range within their particular 
band (ORG5 Pg 5).  The system makes no mention of intrinsic rewards, but instead focussess on 
the monetary increases.  In PUBORG2’s reward system, there is no prescribe number of 
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employees who can be awarded increases.  All the employees are eligible to receive performance 
increases.  However, there is the inherent problem represented by the term “funding agreed 
upon”.  It seems that in all rewards system, all performance pay systems in the public sector, 
funding is a caveat of contempt.  This system, while it purports to give all employees a 
opportunity at increases, is actually limited by the amounts it has available.  If  90% of the 
employees earn an increase, the funds must be spread across all.  In this, we find the problem of 
substantial rewards.  As stated in the literature, for a reward to have motivational value, it must 
be effective and substantial in that light. 
 PUBORG2 did not mention the issue of funding the system.  As was stated before, many 
organizations find the inclusion of budget concerns inherent in the proposal of the new pay 
system.  Yet, as you examine the budget issue closely, it becomes apparent that all organizations, 
especially those in the public sector, must explore and examine exactly how the new system will 
deal with funding issues.  It is a shortsighted on the part of PUBORG2 to accept that the new 
system will experience no budgetary problems, even if the old system did not.   
 After completing a review of the system schematic, I interviewed an individual involved 
in human resources for the organization, the individual will be refered to as SPUBORG2.  After I 
asked her who initiated the implementation of the performanced-based pay scheme and why, she 
stated that the county had initiated the discussions on the subject of moving to a merit pay 
system.  She also stated that their motivation was to make the agency, and county government, 
more responsive to the community (ORG6 Pg 1).  I then asked SPUBORG2 if the organization 
had suffered any culture shock as a response to the system change, and she responded that during 
the planning stages the employees, chief administrator, and consultants worked together to 
devise a system that was fair and transparent.  She also stated that the inclusive nature of the 
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process limited any surprizes and facilitated acceptance by the organization.  I then asked if the 
union was involved in the initial planning.  SPUBORG2 stated that the unions did not have much 
disagreement with the issue, and stated that their evaluation of the county’s motivation for the 
change was positive (ORG6 Pg 1).  I then asked what was the biggest factor in the success of the 
system.  SPUBORG2 stated that she believed that the ability of the system to trace employee 
outputs and competencies was key.  Continuing by stating that the ability to marry the outputs, 
clearly, to a measure, was paramount in the system’s success (ORG6 Pg 1).  In relation to the 
evaluation process, I asked if the process was administered fairly and as prescribed.  
SPUBORG2 expalined that the evaluation process is managed as it was planned.  She stated that 
the process is fair, and that supervisors are trained to evaluate employees equitably.  She 
continued by stating that although the system is driven by the first line supervisors, once 
evaluations are completed, assistants and the chief administrator review then for continuity.  
Additionally, SPUBORG2 stated that the use of self evaluations promotes the transparency of the 
system, and that it is a big factor in giving the employees a sense of control in the process.  She 
points to the self evaluation element as integral to the evaluation process (ORG6 Pg 1).  I then 
asked if there had been any modifications to the system since its inception.  SPUBORG2 stated 
that there had been some modifications to the system including a change to a four teir system, the 
inclusion of a classification system to accompany the number evaluation, and use of computer 
software to automate the process.  SPUBORG2 then expounded on each.  She stated that the 
three tier system was found to be to restrictive and there was a need for a higher band, thus it was 
implemented for those employees with great experience and particular expertise (ORG6 Pg 1-2).  
Continuing, SPUBORG2 stated that the classification was incorporated as a byproduct of the 
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automation, and was used to identify employees from a high level, Achiever, to a low level, 
Learner/Corrective (ORG6 Pg 1-2).  
  Finally, she explained the automated system.  She stated that the first line supervisor 
makes subjective determinations on performance, those results are then enter into the computer 
program as objective responses, the computer assigns the correct weights to each category, and 
an evaluation rating is determined (ORG6 Pg 2).  She stated that the automation had been 
successful in her determination.  I then asked about the concept of proportionate rewards and if 
she felt the rewards in the system were sufficient.  SPUBORG2 stated that the increases have 
been acceptable to the employees since the implementation of the program, she did however 
understand the limitations placed on the system by fundung issues, and the possibility that 
budget concerns could become an issue in the future (ORG6 Pg 2).  I continued by asking if the 
orgaization recognized team work.  SPUBORG stated that while the organizational culture 
dictates that employees assist one another regularly, there is no specific program to recognize 
teamwork, with the only possible exception being as a part of the motivational factor evaluation 
(ORG6 Pg 2). Finally, I asked it there was one issue that she thought was imporant to the system 
functionality, and SPUBORG2 stated that the system ensures that outside influences, issues that 
the employees have no control over, are considered in the evaluaion process.  She stated that this 
factor lends credence to the systems equity (ORG6 Pg 2). 
 I then interviewed an employee of PUBORG2, who will be refered to as WPUBORG2.  
The individual has been employed by the organization under the old and new pay systems and 
was involved in the last bargining agreement with the county.  I first asked WPUBORG2 what 
was his assessment of the old pay plan.  He stated that the plan incorporated grade/step increases, 
was based on longivity and seniority, and that it worked fine.  He continued by explaning that the 
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there was no need for the change, and that the county was a driving force behind it (ORG7 Pg1).  
I then asked if there had been any culture shock as result of the new system.  WPUBORG2 stated 
that the county offered enhancements in order to ensure the new system was implemented, and 
that the organization accepted the change with no problems.  He went on to state that the 
employees at the organization all try to do a good job, and that the implementation of the system 
had little effect on that (ORG7 Pg 1).  I then asked if he felt the system was fair.  WPUBORG2 
stated that the system was unfair in that it does not recognize meritorious efforts.  He continued 
by explaining that system’s inability to recognize performance was due to the nature of the work 
it was measuring, the work is done the same by most employees, and the measuement instrument 
being ineffective (ORG7 Pg1).  I followed by asking if the evaluation system was fairly 
managed.  WPUBORG2 stated that the evaluations were done fairly and the measures were 
clear, with no favoritism, however, he stated that process was time consuming and that even the 
self evaluation process was too labor intensive for the increases offered.  I then asked what the 
best and worst attributes of the system were.  WPUBORG2 advised that the best attribute was 
that the system had a distinct and understandable structure, and that it represented a system that 
was easy to understand (ORG7 Pg 1).  Continuing, he stated that the worst attribute was that the 
system is dysfunctional, explaining that it does not produce increased performance in any way.  I 
followed by asking if others in the organization felt the same way.  WPUBORG2 stated that 
most people in the organization feel that the new system is dysfunctional, and believe that there 
was no need for it at all.  Also, he stated that while he had not suffered adverse actions as a result 
of the new system, he believed it was a waste of time (ORG7 Pg 2).  I then asked if the pay band 
system was functional.  WPUBORG2 stated that the band system does not recognize 
contributions of individuals within the bands.  He stated that the fact that the bands, and 
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promotion out of the bands is contingent on time, makes the system dysfunctional.  He also 
stated that employees in the lowest band can complete tasks better than those in higher bands, 
but must wait to be promoted (ORG7 Pg 2).  I continued by asking WPUBORG2 what he would 
change in the system.  He stated that he would increase the compensation flexability within the 
pay bands and increase the reward amounts, explaining that the current rewards and marginal 
increases in compensation are not motivating factors (ORG7 Pg 1).  I then asked specifically 
about funding levels and their effect on the system.  WPUBORG2 stated that the funding issue 
has always been a problem.  He advised that it affects all members of the organization, and that it 
forces the system to be funded at very low levels.  He continued by stating that the low funding 
levels result in low increases and rewards, and makes the whole system suspect (ORG7 Pg 2).  
WPUBORG2 closed by stating that the system, in practice, operates as designed, but in actual 
outcomes, it does not promote nor recognize employee performance (ORG7 Pg 2).   
 In the study of PUBORG2, the initial examination of the system gives a positive 
indication.  From the planning, implementation, and general tenets, the organization seems to 
have implemented a performance pay system free from the award limitations, that promotes clear 
performance, that incorporates progressive ideas, and that has an inclusive manner.  The 
organization seems to give a clear representation of the need for the change, has been able to win 
union support, and is making modifications as the system evolves.  In looking at the system from 
all points represented by the literature, it should function well.  The only contentious issue in the 
entire system is that of restricted funds.  I point it out due to the fact that I recognized it in the 
analysis.   
 As the interview with SPUBORG2 begins, it seems that she to is positive concerning the 
entire system.  She begins by stating that the organization made great efforts to include 
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employees in the planning process, she states that the evaluation system is fairly administered, 
and that self evaluation, a progressive concept, is considered a central part.  SPUBORG2 also 
states that there is no forced distribution in the system, which makes everyone eligible for 
increases.  She also states that the organization recognizes that there are factors beyond the 
control of employees, and considers those factors in the evaluation process.  In the end, 
SPUBORG2 gives a positive appraisal of the system, and even when pressed on the issue of 
funding, states that funding has not been an problem.  If the analysis stopped here, we would 
have a blueprint for the functional performance-based pay plan, but it does not.     
 Next I interviewed WPUBORG2, an employee under the old and new systems.  
WPUBORG2 gave a much different appraisal from those presented in the schematic and by 
SPUBORG2.  A cynic would say that WPUBORG2 probably has an schema, and is thus giving 
answers to further that agenda.  While I understand that possibility, the answers given by 
WPUBORG2 seem to follow the same threads that are present in the discussion in PUBORG1.  
In giving his opinions on the pay system, WPUBORG2 states that funding is the most 
compelling problem.  He states that due to the lack of funding, the system has become 
dysfuctional.  He qualifies that in saying that the system offers little, if no, rewards, and that 
budget amounts for peformance increases are not motivational.  He also says that the use of the 
pay band system, including the use longivity as the requisite for promotion, and the current 
problem of employee performance in lower pay band exceeding the performance of employees 
in higher pay bands, brings the entire system into question.  I find some intuitve truths in these 
statements.   
 First, the possible funding problems were apparent when analyzing the system schematic.  
If a certain amount of funding is agreed upon before the evaluations are completed, there is room 
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for these types of problems.  Additionally, I also alluded to the possible incongruency of using 
longivity and performance based evaluation within the pay band system.  It seems that the 
WPUBORG2’s comments lend merit to my observations.  In addition, it is not very often that a 
schematic and operational system fit so perfectly, as SPUBORG2 would represent.  There is 
always some element, some part of a system, that simply does not function as planned.  Once 
again, as in the other organizations, the contentious issue of funding represents this element.. 
 After having examined the Department of Defense, PUBORG1, and PUBORG2, I will 
now begin an analysis of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and their proposed Max 
HR system.  This analysis will take the same form as the examination of the DOD system, as it is 
in the process of implementation and has no basis for study in the functional respect.  However, 
one change in the approach is to include data from the interview of a supervisor who is currently 
trained and being evaluated under the system.  
 The new performance-based pay system is proposed to positively influence the human 
resource function in the Department of Homeland Security.  The change to the performance-
based, Max HR system, was precipitated by a number of factors: the continued drive by the Bush 
administration to incorporate a merit based pay system into the government, the creation of the 
new Department of Homeland Security following the September 11th attacks, with its amalgam 
of agencies, the need for a management system to address the diversity, and the preceived failure 
of the General Schedule system.  These are all factors that have fueled the performance-based 
pay issue at DHS.   
 In order to address these issues and to facilitate implementation of the new system, the 
department engaged in a number of initiatives.  During the Max HR design process, DHS 
utilized inclusive measures.  The organization incorporated employee committees, workgroups, 
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and input from stakeholders, including management and employees from all levels, to arrive at a 
what they believe is a  functional system ( USDHS Pg 5274).  Additionally, once the main tenets 
of the system were constructed, DHS engaged in a series of “Meet and Confer” sessions, in 
which the system was presented to additional stakeholders, including union representatives from 
the four largest labor groups, in an effort to illuminate any problems in the system (USDHS Pg 
5275).  In the end, DHS took the information provided by the employees and other stakeholders 
and made adjustments to the system before the final regulations were inacted.  Here we see a 
example of the principle of system legitimacy.  The literature espoused the need for a system to 
be acceptable to the employees and culture.  In that light, DHS used inclusion to ensure that their 
new system was influenced by a large number of stakeholders leading to the system’s validity. 
 In relation to the reasons for implementating Max HR in replacement of the General 
Schedule, DHS states that the new system was needed to change the culture of entitlement, 
represented by the the General Schedule, to an environment where employees can be recognized 
and rewarded for their contributions, and where the employees understand what is expected of 
them (Max HR Fact Pg 1).  DHS also believes the performance-based system will facilitate 
higher performance by implementing skill based training and developement opportunities, and 
will create a culture of performance driven progress (Max HR Fact Pg1).   Additionally, DHS 
explains that the new system is needed to assure the agencies continued ability to attract, retain, 
and reward a workforce that is capable of meeting critical mission requirements (USDHS Pg 
5273).  This is based on the belief that for government to be competitive in recruiting high 
quality employees, they must have flexability in hiring and setting salaries as in the private 
sector.  
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  Here, DHS incorporates familiar concepts as seen in the literature and in other 
organizations.  The idea that government agencies include a measure of performance in 
replacement of longivity has been discussed as an important element in improving organizational 
efficiency.  In addition, the idea that government employees should receive pay on par with the 
private sector is a driving concept in merit pay.  The inclusion of the training and development 
opportunities exemplifies the notion of intrinsic rewards being important motivational factors. 
 The DHS utilized general tenets that they believe are integral to the success of the 
system.  These tenets, which encompasss both orgaizational objectives and concepts on which 
the new system will be based, communicate principles that will determine how Max HR will be 
implemented and managed.  In the Max HR Employee Fact Sheet, the first tenet, “Setting Clear 
Expectations,” refers to management’s ability to communicate, clearly, the expectations and 
performance standards (Pg 1).  In this tenet, the concept of clearly stated and understood 
expectations and measures of evaluation are apparent.  The literature acknowledges transparency 
as having a signicant effect on employee acceptance and trust of a new system.   
 The second tenet, that the system will accurately reflect individual contributions (Pg 1), 
incorporates the idea that the individual will be measured on his or her performance and role in 
accomplishing organizational goals.  Inherent in this tenet is that the employee will also be 
accountable for failing to perform properly.  Again, the concepts mesh with those in the 
literature.  Any performance-based pay system must identify the employees who perform at a 
high level  This is the identifying precept of the system.  But equally, if not more important, the 
system must also identify the poor performers and ensure their deficiencies are addressed.   
 The third tenet, which is to promote a continous learning environment and create new 
opportunities and leadership (Pg 1), exhibits the concept of intrinsic rewards as discussed in the 
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literature.  Intrinsic rewards are reported as a much more far reaching motivational factor than 
monetary compensation.  That idea is understood by DHS, and its inclusion as a general tenet 
shows its importance.   The fourth and fifth tenets address the organizational culture of DHS, and 
include building a culture of organizational trust, facilitating communication and feedback, and 
utilizing coaching to enhance performance.   
 As discussed in case studies and literature, the actual and percieved equity of a merit pay 
system is important.  That equity, percepitated by trust between managers, employees, and 
ultimately the organization, is the foundation for a performance-pay system’s acceptance and 
ultimate success.  In addition, the ideas of communication, top down and bottom up, are 
important as they relate to communication, but are also important as the system evolves and 
modifications need to be implemented.  Communication is the key to an open and transparent 
system, and in the inclusion of this concept, DHS is insuring that the organization continues to 
incorporate open communication during implentation and as the system changes. 
   Finally, the concept of coaching ( Pg 1), which was not addressed in the literature, is, I 
feel, a valuable addition.  As discussed in the literature, and in case studies, the correction of 
poor performing employees is an important function of any human resource system, DHS 
accepts that idea and incorporates it into Max HR. 
 DHS also incudes the use of pay bands within Max HR.  The use of pay bands allows the 
organization the ability to hire new employees and compensate then at levels that more closely 
mirror the rates in the private sector (USDHS Pg 5278).  This flexability is seen as a central 
reason for the implementation of the new system.  Max HR is set up with four broad-pay bands, 
which are actually four levels (Recommendations Pg.1).  Within each level or band, there is a 
maximum and minimum compensation rate, which can represent a difference of twenty thousand 
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dollars or more.  In this pay band system, DHS incorporates the ideas of a flexible pay scheme, 
involving the ability of the agency to hire personnel at competitive salaries, and retain those 
employees who are attracted to the private sector.  Additionally, the system functions to place 
employees in the proper band, contingent on market demand and experience, and ensure they are 
compensated at the correct level.  DHS represents the use of pay bands as completely fuctional, 
with no negative attributes.  In examining the literature, this is a simplistic view of the system, 
and pay bands do come with inherent risks, both for the organization and the employees.  Pay 
bands must be intensely managed for the financial viability of the organization and continued 
validity of the system, and the possibility that the band system will inhibit employee progression, 
through by extraneous causes, is always a possibility.  
 The evaluation process within Max HR is centered on the concept that there will be a 
direct line of sight between an employee’s goals and the department’s objectives, and that 
employee goals may be adjusted depending on organizational needs (Max HR Tutorial).  Here, 
as in the DOD’s system, we find the idea that mission is the most important issue.    This issue is 
only discussed in the NSPS and Max HR systems.  While it seems intuitive that the concept of 
“mission first” would be functional in a military setting, at DHS it seems out of place and 
counter to building a system that works to improve and evaluate employee performance.   
 At the beginning of an evaluation period, the employee is responsible for the completion 
of self appointed goals.  This is completed as an element of the structured system, and gives the 
employee input into the process.  After completing the personal goals, the employee meets with a 
supervisor to discuss those goals and arrives at measurement goals for the evaluation.  These 
ultimate goals are designed with the current ability and capabilities of the particular employee in 
mind (Max Hr Tutorial).  Once the goals for the employee are set, the employee then works to 
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meet all the performance standards.  At the midpoint of the evaluation period, a second meeting 
is held where the employee’s progress is discussed.  Finally, at the completion of the evaluation 
period, a final meeting, in which the employee completes a self evaluation, is held (Max HR 
Tutorial).  In that meeting, the supervisor, using information from the employee’s self evaluation 
and their own appraisal of the employee, determines if the employee was successful in 
completing the assigned goals (Max HR tutorial).  This evaluation system contains the general 
ideas presented in the literature, but also adds a progressive element.  The use of the initial 
meeting to discuss the evaluation goals and the evaluation process lends credence to the entire 
system.   
 Likewise, the midpoint meeting allows for clarification and measurement of the 
employees progression.  This is important to the legitimacy of the system, and also works to 
make the evaluation process clear and transparent.  DHS makes it clear that the system will be 
fair, and that all information as to performance will be available to the employee, yet the 
organizations also includes the concept of self appointed goals and self evaluation.  In the 
examination of PUBPRG2,  I discussed the issue of self evaluation, stating that it gave the 
employee a sense of control within the evaluation system.  In this case that is true also, but the 
inclusion of self appointed goals is another valuable addition.  By allowing the employee to have 
some self determination, the organization accomplishes two things; First it allows the supervisor 
to understand what the employee believes is important, and secondly it gives the supervisor a 
starting point from which to formulate proper goals and measurements for each employee.   
 Aside from the “mission first” issue, there is another, more problematic issue, within the 
system.  The fact that the supervisor sets a subjective set of goals for each employee intuitively 
means that the employees are not being judged in a uniform manner.  That is, the possibility of a 
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high performer having to meet higher requirement than a low performer is inherent in the system.  
While I undertand that an organization has a diverse workforce, with different strengths and 
weaknesses, the performance-based pay system must pay the performers.  The measure is unfair 
to the employees the system is purported to reward, and as we have seen in the literature, the 
measurement instrument must be fair to everyone. 
 In regards to rewards and funding, Max HR puts no forced distribution in the system.  As 
discussed earlier, this means that all employees are eligible to receive a performance increase or 
reward, but a major problem with the system is that it does not address what the awards 
payments or increases will be.  The organization touts the idea that it will reward high 
performing individuals, stating the higher the performance, the higher the pay (USDHS Pg 
5277), but then fails to give any indication of what the increases or awards might be.   
 In addition, there is only a cursory discussion concerning the initial cost of the system, 
and how it will be funded in the future.  DHS states that the initial cost of implementation will be 
met by the training budget, and if it is needed, a shift in funds from other programs (USDHS Pg 
5317).  The organization continues by using an elaborate series of regulations, most of which are 
indecipherable, to explain what the payments will be, and where the funds will come from 
(USDHS Pg 5318-5336).  This is the most troubling element of the system.  A viable system 
must explain how funding will be completed, both for implementation and continued 
management, and as stated throughout the literature, must communicate that to the stakeholders.  
Max HR fails to provide that information. 
 The DHS manager I interviewed has been employed by a  component of DHS for the past 
two decades, and has operated under the General Schedule for the majority of his employment.  
Recently he and other managers attended training on the management of Max HR and were 
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placed, as an initial group, on the Max HR program. He will be refered to SDHS.  I first asked 
SDHS if he felt that there was any problems with the General Schedule.  He stated that the 
General Schedule was functional, but that in practice the managers had failed to implement the 
needed sections of the adverse job actions.  He continued by stating that group supervisors, as a 
whole, were poor at implementing the General Schedule, and that given supervisors who were 
not “frightened” of their subordinates, the system could operate properly.  I then asked what 
SDHS thought of the organization’s preparation for the implementation of Max HR.  He stated 
that the organization had done little to prepare the workers for the change.  He stated that there 
was no thought of organizational culture, and that on the contrary, the organization not only 
implemented the change in pay plans, but at the same time, significantly changed the job 
responsibilites within the department.  He stated it was too much change for many to handle and 
resulted in mass retirements and resignations.   
 When asked if  the Max HR system was fair,  SDHS stated that the system was unfair 
because after the meetings, goals, and evaluations, the first line supervisors had too much imput 
and no one to answer to.  He continued by explaining that the issue of personal feelings, the 
buddy system, would hinder the equity of the system.  In terms of the fairness in the evaluation 
process within Max HR, SDHS stated that the evaluation process is unclear, and remains unclear 
even after the training he had just attended.  He stated that the fact that managers must lower 
goals for less capable employees brings the system’s fairness into question.  He also explained 
that as a manager, he must set subjective goals based on the employee’s ability. He then stated 
that it was not fair to judge individuals with different abilities the same, but in the end stated that 
judging on performance should indicate the use of a single measure of that performance.   
       95
 In relation to his recent training, I asked SDHS if it prepared him to effectively manage 
the system.  He stated that he had not been trained properly, but felt that he would work it out as 
he began to implement the system.  I then asked if the evaluation system, as designed, tied 
rewards to performance.  SDHS stated that he felt the system was good at tying the two together, 
and that the system was also very open to communication and information transfer.  He also 
stated the major problem lies in that the system fails to recognize high performers due to the 
differential measurements already discussed.  In relation to his position as a new employee under 
the system, I asked SDHS if he had his initial meeting with his supervisor.  He stated that he had 
received an email from his supervisor requesting his self initiated goals, but that he had no 
meeting to dicsuss his performance measures.  He then stated he did not know when his 
evaluation period had started.  I then asked SDHS about the role of managers in the Max HR 
system.  He stated that there is nothing in Max HR that will make the managers implement it any 
more successfully than the General Schedule.  He continued by explaining that the supervisors 
were so afraid of adverse work actions that the majority would find a way to give all the 
employees the highest rating possible.  Finally, I asked SDHS about the funding of Max HR.  He 
stated that at his recent training, the group had asked the trainer, a contractor, about the 
possibility of the system going unfunded, he stated the contractor explained that was an absurd 
notion.  SDHS continued by stating that he believes that the funding issue will ultimately make 
the system undesirable for the employees.  He concluded by stating that in his opinion, all 
changes in compensation plans benefit the organization more than the employees.     
 The data from the documents were used to determine the organizational perspective on 
performance-based pay systems.  Through my analysis, it became clear that certain patterns, 
containing the concepts of organizational change, system function, and system dysfunction were 
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present in all the study’s merit pay systems.  These concepts gave a clear indication of how 
successful the pay plan had been and the prospect for its continued viability.   
Organizational Change  
 Organizational change represents an amalgamation of motivations, expressed by all study 
organizations, for the change to performance-based pay.  In addition, it contains the concepts and 
practices that the organizations believe to be central to a functional transition.      
 The organizations espouse that the change from the grade/step system, represented by the 
General Schedule, is necessary for the advent of performance-based pay.  The two systems are 
incongruent, and for performance to be recognized appropriately, the organizations believe that a 
new system of pay and management must be implemented.  The organizations also believe that 
the measure of an employee’s success should not be his or her ability to remain at a job, but 
should instead be based on their performance of the job.  They state that the use of longevity as a 
performance measure is antiquated, and further explain that the use of performance measures and 
incentives are needed to change work environments to reflect the organizational values of 
performance.    
 The organizations also express that accountability is a major factor for the change, 
forwarding the idea that public organizations, and public workers, should be accountable to the 
public in some measurable way.  In addition, they state that with that accountability, the worker 
should have the ability to have his or her individual contributions recognized and awarded by the 
people, through the organization.  The use of performance pay increases, and awarding one time 
bonuses, is seen as a functional way to reward the inputs of employees, while also providing a 
way to show that the individual is valued for their contributions to the organization’s success.   
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 The organizations feel that the concept of organizational culture is important when 
considering impending change.  They state that at the onset of a new pay system, during the 
implementation stage, it is paramount that the system is clearly communicated to the 
stakeholders, including employees and managers.  They state that the communication must be 
reciprocal in nature, and that it must be opened to reflect the ideals that the organization and the 
employees hold as important.  They also state that organizational culture must remain a 
consideration as the work environment evolves, and the system implements changes.  Here the 
organizations feel that it is equally important to ensure that any changes are congruent with the 
culture.  
System Function  
 System function incorporates the attributes that the organizations have identified as 
affecting the functionality of all the studied performance-based systems.  The organizations 
provided that these concepts, when incorporated, determine the ultimate success of the system, 
and its overall sustainability. 
 The organizations state that primarily, a merit pay system needs to be inherently 
equitable.  That is, that all facets of the system must be conceived in a manner that promotes 
openness and trust, and that facilitates the concept of trust throughout the organization.  They 
explain that the concept of trust is a product of having open communication that flows from the 
top of the organization down and from the bottom up.  They also explain that this 
communication is the foundation for the continued exchange of ideas that lead to feedback from 
diverse groups within the organization.  With the input, employees and managers feel they have 
a stake in the system, and will continue to work at enhancing it.      
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 The organizations also state that using clearly expressed goals, goals that are easily 
understood by management and employees and are communicated to the organization, via the 
system, are the key to tying performance to rewards.  They explain that a functional 
performance-based pay system must facilitate employee understanding as to what he or she is 
expected to accomplish, and what the rewards will be upon reaching their goals.  The 
organizations also point to the evaluation process as an important element in accurately matching 
achieved goals with rewards.  They state that the evaluation process must maintain its 
transparency.  To that end, the organizations feel that evaluation systems must be free from 
elaborate matrixes that force the managers to judge on criteria that is hard to define and difficult 
to measure.  They suggest instead, a system that is open to all employees, that is explainable in a 
short description, and that in the end, works to promote the attainment of awards, and not be an 
impediment to them.   
 The utilization of pay bands, as an element of performance-based pay, was expressed by 
the organizations as integral to the operation of such systems.  The organizations explained that 
pay banding allows them flexibility in relation to pay issues, and enables them to recruit 
employees from the private sector, resulting in the most experienced and knowledgeable 
employee pools.  They explained that pay bands are the foundation of performance-based pay, 
and that for the system to operate effectively it must have the ability to reward employees, within 
preset limits, using a structure that incorporates the concept of rewards and incentives.  The 
organizations believe that pay banding fits the function perfectly. 
System Dysfunction 
 System dysfunction includes the problematic areas found in the performance-based 
systems of the study.  In my analysis two were discovered. While one of the issues is the result 
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of the systems themselves, the other is the result of an extraneous variable that affects the 
systems.  
 The organizations all state that they use first line supervisors to drive their performance-
based systems.  They state that the supervisors are responsible for meeting with the employees, 
in most cases assigning goals, and are the ultimate evaluator in determining if the employee’s 
performance is acceptable.  The organizations also stated that after their initial training, the 
supervisors are free to run the system as instructed, with the only caveat being that upon adverse 
job action, or bringing a complaint against an employee, a higher authority reviews the 
supervisor’s decision.  In this, the inherent problem of the human factor is apparent.  The human 
factor refers to behavior of human beings as they interact with one another.  The human factor is 
implicit in the function of all systems, but more so in performance-based pay systems.  
Performance-based pay is contingent on the belief that an employee will be judged fairly on the 
issue of his or her performance only.  The organizations, by allowing the first line supervisors to 
operate with only marginal checks, increase the possibility that the managers will award 
increases on factors other than performance.  Additionally, as seen in the management of the 
General Schedule, supervisors are not likely to initiate adverse job actions due to the necessity of 
their decisions being reviewed, and to that end, most managers are lenient in the way they 
evaluate employees due to the possibility that poor evaluations could result in a troublesome 
work environment.   
 The issue of funding was a major concern to all of the organizations.  In examining the 
most problematic issues of funding, the organizations stated that the overall lack of funding 
caused the entire performance-based pay system to be questioned and resulted in employees 
losing faith in the system and becoming discontented.  This lack of funding results from a 
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number of practices; projecting rewards, projecting the percentage of employees who will 
receive rewards, prescribing the amount of awards that will be given, and the inability of the 
organization to control its own funding.  In relation to projected awards, the organizations often 
use an informed guess, based on the information they have available at the time, to decide the 
amount of funding they will need for incentive bonuses.  The problem is that once the money is 
budgeted, the estimate may not, and often does not, cover the actual expense.  The result is that 
the employees who have performed and met their goals go unrewarded.  Relative to projecting 
awards based on a percentage, the organization determines, by estimate, what percentage of the 
employees will perform at levels that will result in payments, say 15%, and the organization then 
budgets for an amount that represents the percentage.  The problem occurs if the estimate is low.  
In that event, again, those workers who were given goals to attain and performed well enough to 
reach them, are denied their due payments.  Additionally, some organizations engage in placing 
limits on the number of employees that can receive incentive payments or awards.  This is 
problematic, in that, if more than the prescribed numbers of employees qualify for payments, the 
organization will simply refuse to compensate them although they attained the goals that were 
set.  In other systems, there are no limits placed on awarding incentives, but the organizations 
still express funding problems with those systems. The organizations state that systems which do 
not use forced distribution often suffer from having inadequate funds to pay all the high 
performers.  That is, that in a system where all employees are capable of earning incentive 
payments based on their performance, the system is not prepared or able to make payments to 
everyone.  In that event, the managers either pay individuals based on some other factor, possibly 
rotating payments from performer to performer over time, or spread the incentives payments 
across all the employees with the results of the incentives becoming a non-motivational factor.   
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 The organizations also expressed that their inability to control their funding was of 
paramount importance.  They stated that although there performance-based pay systems were 
fair, the lack of funding, or in some instances non-funding, of the system proved to render the 
system dysfunctional.    
 The data from the interviews was then used to determine the perspectives of the managers 
and workers as to their conclusions on the function of the system that they worked within. 
Management Perspective   
 Management perspective encompasses the opinions and beliefs of the human resource 
managers as to function of their particular merit pay system.  It includes the manager’s feelings 
on four general concepts; system equity, system function, system implementation, and also 
includes additional items that the managers felt were important.   
 The managers feel that the systems are fair in that they use evaluation elements that are 
clear and tie performance to rewards in a meaningful way.  They also stated that the systems 
operated in an open manner, and that this ensured their ability to remain equitable.  
  In relation to the function of the systems, the managers stated that the systems have 
sound theoretical rational, but that it was difficult, in some cases, to transfer that theory into 
functional practice. They also stated that the problem of funding is always a concern, and that in 
many cases funding issues; the lack of funding or no funding at all, has rendered the entire 
system dysfunctional.  The managers stated that funding contributes to the problems of low 
motivation for employees when they understand that no matter their performance, they may not 
be paid what has been promised due to funding.   
 Relative to system implementation, the managers feel that the systems were implemented 
properly, with attention to organizational culture and sufficient communication.  They explain 
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that the organizations could have engaged in better planning in some cases, but that the overall 
estimation of the process was positive.   
 The managers then discussed some issues that they felt were important.  They stated that 
systems that utilize self-evaluations, where the employees rate their own performance, and which 
account for factors outside the control of employees, as in the involvement of other organizations 
in the completion of goals, allow for a more thorough and fair evaluation.  The managers also 
stated that funding issues undermine the system’s ability to function and that the inability to pay 
employees after they have performed is unfair and cause the entire system to be in question. 
Employee Perspective 
 Employee perspective incorporates the opinions and beliefs of the employees as to 
function of their particular merit pay system.  It includes the employee’s feelings on four general 
concepts; system equity, system function, system implementation, and also includes additional 
items that they felt were important.   
 The employees stated that the systems were not fair in that they provided additional 
payments for individuals that were not available to others.  This was exemplified by the system 
offering large increases to new hires, but after those employees reached a level of compensation 
their pay was no longer increased due to budget issues.  The employees did state that the 
evaluation systems were managed in a fair fashion, they were open and easy to understand, but 
that the system’s one inequity made it unfair for all involved.   
 Relative to system’s function, the employees stated that the systems did not affect the 
performance of employees due to the lack of funding.  They stated that the systems provided 
incentives and clearly communicated goals, but failed to pay them meaningful rewards. This was 
due to the system being under funded or not funded at all.  They stated that the issue of funding 
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contributed to the feeling of apathy in relation to the performance system and the possibility of 
rewards, and that in the end, the performance-based pay systems were seen as non-motivational 
issues.  The employees also explained that once the payments were withheld, the system loss all 
credibility.  
  In relation to system implementation, the employees felt that the implementation process 
was handled well by management, but that in the future, more attention should be paid to the 
timing of that implementation.  Finally, the employees stated that the systems are sound in what 
they propose to accomplish, but the problems occur when the systems are put into practice.  They 
stated that the organization’s lack of control in the funding issue undermines the foundation of 
the performance-based system.   
Max HR Continuity Concerns 
 Continuity concerns examines the differences in the organizational plan for Max HR and 
how the plan is being managed from the perspective of a manager, both covered by and 
managing, the new system. 
  In the initial study of the implementation of Max HR, it appeared that it was inclusive 
and effective, and that DHS had taken great strides to ensure the system was accepted by the 
employees.  SDHS stated, to the contrary, that DHS had not included anyone he knew of in the 
process, and that even if he had been included, the system had been implemented at the worst 
time possible.  He stated that along with the implementation of the new pay plan, the 
organization had changed the responsibilities of many organizations.  He stated that the result 
was mass retirements and resignations.  
  In explaining the need for the change to Max HR, DHS cited the General Schedule and 
its outdated management structure, SDHS stated that the General Schedule was still functional, 
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and he felt that the managers, the same managers that were going to manage Max HR, had failed 
in enforcing the employee descipline procedures.  SDHS also stated that the same managers, who 
are frightened to initiate negative work actions, would find a way to give the highest evaluations 
they could under Max HR.  Max HR espouses to evaluate performance in a fair and equitable 
manner.  When asked his opinion, SDHS stated that the system is unfair due to the fact that the 
first line supervisors have to much descretion without much oversight.  He stated that this would 
lead to individuals receiving evaluations based on factors other than performance.  SDHS also 
stated that the evaluation process was unclear even after he had been trained.  While he stated 
that the system was effective at tying performance to rewards and offered open communication, 
he also advised that in the end, the use of different measures for employees with different 
capabilities was inequitable and did not properly measure performance.    
 DHS stated that the managers would be trained properly in order to manage the system 
effectively.  SDHS stated that he had not been trained properly, in fact, he stated he had no idea 
how the system was going to function.  He continued by explaining that the training was 
insufficient to prepare him to manage Max HR, but he felt he would work it out as he went.  I 
then asked SDHS about his experience as new member of Max HR, he stated that he had not had 
is initial meeting with his supervisor, but they had exchanged e-mails on the subject.  SDHS then 
stated that he did not know when his evaluation period had started.  In relation to funding, SDHS 
stated that he felt that was the one issue that would render the system undesirable to employees.  
He stated that the system would eventually be unfunded, and no increases would be awa 
 The issues explored here illuminate some of the same concerns stated at the start of this 
project, but include additional issues.  The belief that the system would be unfair, and that it 
would be ineffective in measuring the performance of employees in a proper manner is obvious.  
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The system’s inherent inequity in using different measures and the funding concerns were not an 
issue I considered, and I could not have imagined that the training deficiencies and the 
functioning of the system could be so poor.  Additionally, I would not have believed that the 
same problems that plagued the General Schedule may be present in Max HR. 
 I will now take the information learned from the results of the study and the issues 
explored in the continuity concerns and apply them to a discussion on the Max HR system, in 
terms of its positve and negative attributes.    
Function in the System 
 In examining Max HR, the system incorporates some very functional and progressive 
ideas.  It is important to discuss the positve points contained in the system in an effort to remain 
impartial, but also for the purpose of producing a proper appraisal. 
 The use of self appointed goals within the evaluation element is a progressive concept 
incorporated in Max HR.  The concept allows the employees to communicate the goals and 
issues that they feel are important.  They communicate their goals to their supervisors at the 
onset of the evaluation process.  With that, the supervisor can then customize measures, for 
better of worse, to meet the interests of the individual.  This, as found in this study, allows the 
employees a feeling of control and adds to the legitimacy of the system.  Max HR also 
incorporates the use of employee self evaluation. This concept allows the employee the 
opportunity to examine their performance over the evaluation period and grade themselves.  As 
with self goals, this gives the employee a sense of control, but this concept also ensures the 
employee has some self determination. Max HR accomplishes two very important things through 
the utlization of this concepts: First it allows the supervisor to understand what the employee 
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believes they have accomplished, and secondly it gives the supervisor a starting point from 
which to formulate proper goals and measurements for each employee. 
Dysfunction in the System   
 The Max HR system incorporates elements that have been proven, both in the literature 
and in this study, to be detrimental to the function of a performance-based pay system.  These 
issues must be discussed in an effort to facilitate an understanding of how they will negatively 
effect the success of the system. 
 The analysis of the documents, along with the information gained from the management 
and employee perspectives, has shown that for a system to be functional, it has to be inherently 
equitable.  That is, it has to be fair to all the employees that work within it.  Additionally, the 
system also must link performance to rewards in a signicant way and provide an evaluation 
process that is understandable.  The evaluation element of Max HR fails to incorporate any of 
these concepts.  On the contrary, the system’s use of different measures for different employees, 
based on their individual abilities, measures an abstract concept.  For the system to truly measure 
performance, it is paramount that measures be constant across the organization, or at least within 
agencies or work groups.  Max HR provides no such continuity.  The practice of using different 
measures, while espousing to be fair to the diversity within the organization, actually becomes 
unfair as a result.  It measures something other than performance, it measures a measure of 
performance.  The system actually lowers the standard of performance by allowing the managers 
to lower their expectations to fit the levels of the diverse workers.  For the system to measure and 
award incentives based on this basis is patently unfair, and will ultimately render the system 
dysfunctional.   
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 Max HR also includes the problematic element of the supervisors having sole 
responsibility for managing the system.  In this study, the document analysis showed that 
organizations are concerned with the issue of first line supervisors having a high level of 
evaluative discretion.  The analysis showed that the factor of human interaction can effect the 
managers ability to remain detached and can result in the system being plagued by inaction.  
Max HR ignores this idea and gives its managers sole responsibilty of assessing employee goals, 
evaluating the employees, and subjectively assigning them a performance rating.  The managers 
have little oversight, and there is no grievance procedures in place.   
 Finally, the issue of funding is also problematic for Max HR.  The document analysis 
showed that in relation to funding, the organizations in this study believed it was their biggest 
concern.  Additionally, the managers and employees also pointed to funding issues as rendering 
their performance-based pay systems dysfunctional.  Max HR makes no effort to explain where 
their funding will come from.  While the General Schedule has its well documented problems, it 
never caused a high performing employee to go without a pay increase, on the contrary, it 
allowed the poor performers to be paid as well.  The result of Max HR going unfunded, or under 
funded, will be that no employees, or very few, will receive pay increases.  While it is not certain 
that the system will experience budget problems, this study has shown that to be the exception in 
government and not the rule.  Max HR is being implemented with the promise that it will pay 
high performers for their contributions to the organizations, in reality the system is lowering the 
performance measures of some, while setting them higher for others, and in the end, will not pay 
either. 
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Conclusion   
 The of utilization of performance-based pay within the government has been proven to be 
problematic at best.  In examining the principles of performance-based pay and the attributes of 
functional systems, and after conducting my own study of public organizations that utilize 
performance-based pay, it is clear that there are central tenets that must be present for these 
systems to function and to remain viable.  Max HR is currently being implemented by the 
Department of Homeland Security with inherent problems that violate three of these tenets.  The 
system is patently unfair in its evaluation process by measuring worker performance on a 
variable scale related to individual ability.  The system’s management element provides an 
inordinate amount of discretion to the first line supervisors, which has been proven to result in 
evaluations based on factors other than performance, and the system’s funding element is non-
existent, which has led to catastrophic results when merit pay systems are unfunded or under 
funded.  If Max HR is fully implemented with these fundamental problems, the organization, and 
the employees that work within it, may suffer yet another crisis comparable to the September 
11th attacks, but it will be one that could have been avoided. 
Recommendations  
 At the beginning of this study, I felt that the most important factor inhibiting the 
implementation of performance-based pay would be the system’s inability to faily evaluate 
employees in the public sector.  I believed that the objective, quantifiable measures, used in the 
private sector could not possibly translate into the public sector.  As the study progressed, as I 
completed the research, I found that the measurement issue was not contentious , but that 
funding was the greatest concern.  
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 Throughout the study, the issue that seemed to be in every discussion was the lack of 
funding, or the lack of funding control by the organizations.  The funding problem is inherent in 
government.  The problem is that organizations can implement new systems and initiatives, but 
they are only as functional as Congress makes them, through its control of funding.  In the 
organizations and systems in this study,the managers and employees agree that the negative 
impact of funding is ubiquitous.  This is an issue that must be explored in future research.  It 
must be examined from the perspective of how the funding can be changed to more effectively 
contribute to the goals of pay-for performance systems and the values of elected officials in their 
funding decisions.    
  The unanimous agreement, both of the managers and organizations in this study that the 
General Schedule is patently ineffective must be explored as well.  It is a system that has been 
effective for a long time, despite the fact that it has been mis-managed.  The system must be 
studied to determine if its failures are a result of the system being antiquated, mis-managed, or in 
need of modifications.  This type of study may lend credence to the need for performance-based 
pay, but it is necessary to determine if the system, already in place, can be made viable once 
again. 
 Additionally, throughout the literature, the use of pay bands is expressed in a positive 
light, although the reporting, as discussed, may be skewed.  In this study, pay banding has 
proven to be problematic in that funding constrants tend to limit the increases within the bands, 
while vacancy shortages limit the number of individuals promoted from band to band.  The 
further study of pay banding is essential to determine its overall function as the structure for 
performance-based pay systems.  While it is clear that the systems needs some type of structure, 
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an empirical study of the effectiveness of the banding system would be valuable both to the 
management and function of performance-based schemes in the future.  
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